2.1A note on the Moscow narratives

The actions taken by Russia from 24 February 2022 have been the subject of extensive and well-known justification, with Vladimir Putin reporting that ‘I have taken the decision to carry out a special military operation.... We will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine It is not

our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory, we do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force.’ (^{Putin, 2022}).

Similarly, the Russian invasion of Chechnya in 1994 was not considered as such. On 27 De- cember 1994, days before the start of the battle of Grozny, Boris Yeltsin stated, inter alia:

The Chechen situation was having a destructive effect on Russia’s stability, had become one of the main internal threats to state security, and ...its intention was to restore order in the repu-

blic. Thus, the main mission of the armed forces was to disarm bandit formations and collect or

destroy heavy weaponry. (Thomas cit. Yeltsin, 1995a, p. 236).

Additionally, Yeltsin had stated that the ongoing operations were aimed at restoring cons- titutional order (^{Russell, 2007}). Russia was thus faced with an illegal government, which had not negotiated seriously with Moscow in the previous three years, and a republic that had be- come a centre for terrorists and criminals with links to the Chechen mafia. (Thomas, 1995a). In addition, several Russian officials in 1994 described the military operations as a peacekeeping mission aimed at quashing illegal armed formations (Baev, 1997; Thomas, 1995a and 1995b). It is interesting to note that in the Ukrainian case, Moscow also questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and criticised the Ukrainian authorities for never complying with the Minsk Agreements.

2.2Comparisons at the operational level

Kyiv constituted one of Moscow’s four main targets at the beginning of the invasion (the others being Kharkiv, Donbass and Kherson), advancing into the city along both banks of the Dnipro River and entering the city’s suburbs on 25 February (ISW, 2022a). The aim seemed at the time to encircle Kyiv from the west, north-west and east, to prevent the capital’s access to the west of the country and to force the fall of the Ukrainian government (ISW, 2022b). The attempt to en- circle Kyiv was countered by a strategy of using adjacent localities as a defensive ring around the capital, forcing the Russian army into a strategy of attrition, with the first clashes taking place in Borodyanka, Bucha, Vyshhorod and Chernihiv (ISW, 2022a). The Russian leadership’s ability to assess the situation was also affected by the Ukrainian use of electronic equipment, jeopardising communication between units and commands, causing disruption along the entire front. This allowed Ukrainian units to outflank the outnumbered but outmanoeuvred Russian forces, which were unable to consolidate their advance.

Figure 1 Map of Kyiv and adjacent localities (Source: Europa Technologies, 2018) 

The problems faced refer to mistakes made at the operational level. Dalsjo et al. (2023) iden- tify three errors in this regard: 1) poor coordination of logistics and supply lines, particularly in relation to refuelling and shortages of supplies; 2) failure to achieve air superiority; and 3) mismatch between air and ground forces. At the tactical level, the same authors determined that the Russian army was not well trained for the operations at hand, especially considering Russia’s experience in urban conflicts from Grozny to Aleppo. This led to the use of heavy artillery, long-range missiles and air strikes. In this sense, the first reports of heavy artillery being deployed in this theatre of operations came on 27 and 28 February, days when Russian forces managed to enter Kyiv from the western side of Dnipro, but were unable to enter from the east, encountering strong resistance, despite the use of medium-long-range missiles on key military infrastructure such as railways and airports (ISW, 2022b).

By early March, several localities in the Kyiv suburbs, such as Irpin and Bucha, were sur- rounded or controlled, and the strategy at the time was to deprive the populations of access to the outside and force their surrender, while other localities were hit with artillery fire. At the same time, the resilience of Ukrainian forces led Russia to use this type of weaponry, starting to hit civilian targets (ISW, 2022c). Russian assaults into the centre of Kyiv proved to be disjointed, lacking synergy with each other and easily countered by the Ukrainians, so that by 3 March it was apparent that ‘the conventional Russian military continues to perform poorly’ (ISW, 2022d). Despite this, besieged towns such as Irpin were subjected to siege and starve tactics, i.e. attacking the town and preventing the inhabitants - civilians and military - from accessing any kind of foodstuffs (ISW, 2022e). From 8-9 March, Russian forces seemed to have changed their strategy, trying to consolidate control of the outskirts of Kyiv. It was also from this time that some of the aforementioned logistical problems were confirmed, namely the inability to resupply fuel, as well as the low morale of the troops (ISW, 2022c and 2022d). From the 10th, the Russian forces seem to have entered a set of operational pauses, with the Ukrainian military leadership arguing that: Russia has so far failed to achieve its territorial objectives...and will likely turn to attacking civilian targets. Sporadic and uncoordinated offensive operations against key Ukrainian cities support the assessment. that Russian forces face growing supply and morale problems and have lost the initiative. (ISW, 2022g).

From the 17th, there was a change in the battle, with the Russians maintaining defensive po- sitions and the Ukrainian forces beginning a counter-offensive, which gained pace from the 24th, and it was also from this moment that Russian attacks against civilian infrastructure and the population intensified, as well as the laying of mines along the disputed areas, perhaps preparing a partial ‘scorched earth’ policy. Thus: Russian forces are increasingly shelling civilian infrastructure...in Kyiv and killing civilians....

The Ukrainian Army General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to bomb and conduct airstrikes against residential areas ‘to intimidate the civilian population and reduce Ukraine’s economic potential.’ (ISW, 2022h)

Towns such as Borodyanka were systematically bombed, with few buildings in the locality reportedly left intact (^{Goncharov, 2022}). It was also from the second half of that month that some massacres (notably in Bucha) began to take place, although the precise timing is difficult to deter- mine. (^{Higgins, 2022}; HRW, 2022). Irpin was recaptured on 28 March (ISW, 2022i), and Russian forces began a partial withdrawal in the following days, continuing to undermine their previous positions during the withdrawal (ISW, 2022j). Thus, in early April, Russian offensive activities in and around Kyiv ended. The battle for Kyiv was declared over on 3 April (ISW, 2022k). Regarding the number of dead, there is still no consensus count.

In 1994, the Russian army began its campaign along three axes - North, East and West. (Oli- ker, 2001; Thomas, 1997)In 1994, the Russian army began its campaign along three axes - North, East and West (^{Oliker, 2001}; Thomas, 1997), where on the second and third their march took them past the strongly anti-war republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. However, in the run-up to the invasion, the Russian army was already experiencing a panoply of operational problems, such as underfunding, lack of equipment or outdated equipment, and lack of human resources (both squares and officers). In general, there was a multidimensional lack of preparedness for conflict, notably in the ineffective composition of Russian forces (from different sectors of the security and defence apparatus), which themselves answered to a multitude of commands (from the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and the security services) that, without ever having collaborated in an operation of this nature, demonstrated poor communication and coordina- tion throughout the campaign, even resulting in a high number of deaths due to friendly fire. (Oliker, 2001). Additionally, no military exercises had taken place since 1992, which, coupled with a lack of training in urban settings, resulted in a Russian inability to adjust the deployment of its forces to the Chechen scenario. Finally, Russian forces (and their commanders) believed that operations in Chechnya would be straightforward, leading to a general underestimation of the preparedness of the Chechen resistance and its quality, but also of the civilian contestation of the Russian presence itself (Oliker, 2001; Pilloni, 2000). On the ground, morale, which was reportedly high in the months leading up to the invasion, quickly faded. As the Russian forces advanced, they encountered local resistance along the western and eastern routes, and there were cases where Russian soldiers sympathised with the populations, even giving them directions on how to sabotage Russian equipment. (Oliker, 2001; Thomas, 1995b). Even some Russian soldiers had refused to fulfil orders that, among other things, meant bombing civilian populations. Regar- ding the resistance encountered on the way to Grozny, the Russian forces:

They found...bridges closed and reinforced with concrete blocks, and some bridges...mined. Local inhabitants broadcast the location and actions of Russian troops via...radio. The local po- pulation was clearly prepared to take action against any intervening force (Thomas, 1995b, p. 271).

The Chechen resistance was composed of three rings, the first along the entire route to the suburbs of Grozny, consisting mainly of small villages, the second on the outskirts of Grozny, and the third corresponding to the capital itself. In the second and third ring, the Chechen forces forced the Russian army to fight block by block, causing more casualties than anticipated. The steadfastness of Chechen resistance, ‘a matter of survival as a people and a race’ (Thomas, 1995b,

p. 274) demonstrates the aforementioned observations on the specificity of Chechen identity.

Armed resistance, also by the civilian population, ended up disrupting Russian action, given the Kremlin’s orders not to attack civilians, creating a dissonance between strategic objectives and military doctrine. (Pilloni, 2000, p. 45). This precipitated the use of limited aerial bombardment to deter the population. In reality, the opposite occurred: ‘for the Chechens every bomb that landed affirmed that Russia was an alien entity, an enemy with no other goal than the complete subjugation of the Chechen people’ (Pilloni, 2000, p. 55). When this became apparent, military orders transitioned to more intense bombing of these localities on the way to the capital (Tho- mas, 1997). The situation escalated with violent assaults by Russian fighters, as well as assaults, rapes and killings of Chechens. In the village of Samashki, Russian forces perpetrated the mas- sacre of one hundred civilians (^{Zurcher, 2007}, p. 83). Also infamous were the camps set up to screen Chechen citizens, which were used as torture sites, including for Russian citizens (Pilloni, 2000; Thomas, 1997; Zurcher, 2007).

Figure 2 Map of Chechnya (^{Coene, 2010}, p.50). 

The Battle of Grozny began on 31 December, when the three military columns entered the city with the aim of capturing the main accesses to the city, critical infrastructure and Chechen government buildings, which was to culminate in the conquest of the presidential palace (Oli- ker, 2001). Expectations that Chechen resistance would be short-lived were dashed by the large number of fighters in the city. With the positional advantages associated with the defence of ur- ban environments, Chechen forces quickly surrounded Russian units and destroyed their poorly constituted columns, with the result that hundreds of soldiers were reportedly killed in the first hours of the operation (^{Oliker, 2001}; Thomas, 2001). (Oliker, 2001; Thomas, 1997). The slow ad- vance was also due to orders from Yeltsin himself, who had expressly forbidden bombing the city, which consequently made it impossible to use air power as a complement to the ground advance. On the other side, as it turned out later, the Chechen forces were better equipped and prepared than estimated by Russian intelligence. Plans for the defence of Grozny had been underway for several months and included distribution of commands, zones of responsibility, training of local militias and implementation of communication networks. In terms of equipment, Grozny had acquired equipment such as Grad missile launchers, armoured vehicles and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry (Oliker, 2001).

Russian losses again precipitated the use of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, initially confined to the city centre. On 5 January, and after a restructuring of forces, the Russian army resorted to Soviet tactics, ‘devastating everything and everyone in its path...an extremely des- tructive process’ (Pilloni, 2000, p. 53)This essentially harmed Russian citizens living in the city, as they, unlike the Chechens, had nowhere to run and nowhere to shelter (Thomas, 1997). This tactic was employed until the destruction and conquest of the presidential palace, Dudayev’s cen- tre of operations, on 26 January, whereupon the battle for the rest of the city continued over the next month, being even more destructive, and it may have helped that no Russians lived there. In the end, the bombing of Grozny was considered the worst in Europe since Dresden during World War II, resulting in 20,000 civilian deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees (Schaefer, 2010; Thomas, 1997; ^{Zurcher, 2007}).

2.3.Similarities and Differences between Kyiv and Grozny

Describing the military operations, several similarities can be identified. The first relates to the justification for the interventions - both were not described as wars - a special military opera- tion - and a restoration of constitutional order, and both were justified in at least a disingenuous manner - disarming and denazifying Ukraine - and disarming illegal armed groups. These nar- ratives served the purpose of avoiding designations of war - which would have meant having to respect the Law of War and its Conventions, as well as meaning a general Russian mobilisation. The common element in both cases is that of Russia’s survival, an element that is an inseparable part of Russian strategic culture (^{Gaufman, 2021}; ^{Gotz & Staun, 2022}). The dilution between the national and the territorial, linked to an internal-external nexus and the perception of threats, be it NATO’s eastward expansion or instability in a republic, both interpreted as a threat to the Russian nation, underpins this discourse, which thus emerges as a securitising act (^{Charap, Geist, Frederick, Drennan, Chandler, & Kavanagh, 2021}; Gotz & Staun, 2022). These arguments were not exclusive to Chechnya and Ukraine, but were also used during the Russian invasion of Geor- gia in 2008, and were further refined from the beginning of the Putin era.

At the operational level, the many similarities between 2022 and 1994 should be emphasised, firstly, the lack of proper planning. In both cases, there was a lack of situational assessment and up-to-date information about the enemy as well as the disposition of his forces. When the plans were implemented, the lack of communication made it difficult to adapt quickly to unfolding events. Similar problems can be observed at the planning level. While in 1994 this could be attributed to the poorer general condition of the Russian armed forces, coupled with the lack of training in urban environments, in 2022 the reason will be less clear. Indeed, the experiences of Grozny should have marked the training of troops over the last two decades. On the one hand, this problem can be attributed to the previously indicated poor planning (including in its supply lines), as well as to the Russian insistence on believing that the Ukrainian capital would fall in a few days. On the other hand, the difficulties imposed by Ukrainian tactics may have impacted Russian forces (^{Dalsjo et al., 2022}).

Two other similarities should be emphasised, the first being the general underestimation of the enemy’s capabilities, in terms of preparedness, military equipment and state of mind. In 1994, Chechen forces were more heavily fortified than expected, so Grozny had long-range equipment and even a (small) air force. As for Ukraine, Kyiv capitalised on the large military aid provided, mainly by the US, in the years before the Russian invasion. ^{Sanders (2023}), in his analysis of Ukrainian military reforms, argues that the adoption of a Western-style military reform brought Ukrainian forces to a high level of capability compared to NATO levels, giving it the resilience and flexibility to compete with the Russian enemy (Sanders, 2023).

Second, and as mentioned earlier, if Russian forces, or their generals, thought they would be welcomed in Ukraine and Chechnya, the reality showed otherwise, with active military and civilian resistance to Russian advances. In part, this resistance resulted in the more liberal use of heavy artillery, which made anti-Russian sentiment even greater. As mentioned, both popu- lations saw this as an existential struggle, against a foreign and fundamentally hostile entity. The general morale of the Russian troops was also low, and while in the Chechen conflict this was due to the fact that they did not know exactly why they were there - especially since they were acting in their own country, and against a population of their country, in the Ukrainian case there was an equal lack of knowledge about what was at stake. In both cases, the high casualty figures negatively affected this situation.

Finally, the two interventions demonstrate the evolution of Russian military doctrine in the use of bombardment, both aerial and ground, and heavy artillery, although once again some similarities can be noted. Both Grozny and Kyiv were not subjected to indiscriminate bombard- ment in the early stages, demonstrating similar objectives - to surround the cities and force the fall of their governments. It was only when these objectives proved unattainable and Russian forces were drawn into more localised confrontations with greater resistance that these methods were used less judiciously.