Unconditional basic income and reciprocity

One of the standard objections to the idea of UBI is the reciprocity argument. The argument goes as follows: to be entitled to receive a payment or benefit, one is deemed to also contribute to the social surplus. Not doing so is evading our obligations to others (I receive a gift, that I deny return), and potentially an act of free ridding and exploitation if others are forced to continue contributing to fund benefits. This is linked to Alvin ^{Gouldner’s (1960}) conception of reciprocity as a universal norm. Before him, much of our knowledge came from anthropologists such as Marcel ^{Mauss (2002}), who studied reciprocal interactions in tribes in the Pacific. Gouldner describes the historical evolution of the concept of reciprocity and how it has been the subject of discussion by thinkers from Marx to Durkheim. He also discusses how reciprocity is tied to both exchange and exploitation (Gouldner, 1960, p. 167). These accounts inform Gouldner’s belief in the existence of a universal and generalized norm of reciprocity, where the ties of reciprocity are formed beyond complementarity duties and obligations: “we owe others certain things because of what they have previously done for us, because of the history of previous interaction we have had with them” (^{Gouldner, 1960, p. 171}). For Gouldner, the norm of reciprocity has two fundamental demands: “(1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped them” (^{Gouldner, 1960, p. 171}). While it is universal, reciprocity is not unconditional since it can vary considering the status and position of different people in society. Thus, reciprocity is seen as a stabilization mechanism, promoting social cohesion, and governing interactions. As Gouldner puts it: “if you want to be helped by others you must help them; hence it is not only proper but also expedient to conform with the specific status rights of others and with the general norm” (Gouldner, 1960, p. 173). Gouldner is therefore also arguing that reciprocity allows a reflective equilibrium where one follows the rules, expecting others to do the same. However, and as the sociologist points out, different cultures can implement the norm in different ways. Hence it can be argued that in modern societies, the norm of reciprocity has been expanded to account for other obligations such as the obligation to be employed or to pay taxes.

Such a thought guides Lawrence C. ^{Becker’s work. He deemed reciprocity as a “nonvoluntary social obligation” (Becker, 1980}, p. 40), that needs to be “scaled to competence, ability and benefits” (^{Becker, 1980, p. 41}). Moreover, Becker binds reciprocity to work, a direct link that was not as common before, although implicit in ^{Marx’s anti-capitalist thought, and his discussion of a lower phase of communism (Marx, 1891}). Instead of only discussing reciprocity’s role in organizing labor, Becker tells us that reciprocity is a way to justify nonvoluntary “citizenship obligations”. Through the benefits we receive and how they are generated, or through the demands of a given benefactor, which can be institutionalized demands, reciprocity yields a social obligation to work (^{Becker, 1980, p. 42}).

Alvin Gouldner and Lawrence Becker’s accounts shed light on many of the current debates in reciprocity, particularly in the liberal-egalitarian discussions of justice. John Rawls’ account is the basis from which many philosophers debated how reciprocity should govern justice in entitlements. Reciprocity can be found at least in two aspects of Rawls’ work: One is related to the difference principle, which states that any movement away from equality (such as increasing the wage of the privileged members of society) should benefit the worst-off. Therefore, moving away from equality should be mutually beneficial: it should be reciprocal. There is no reference to an obligation to work or to conditioning income distribution based on individual-level contribution. However, Rawls provides another important account of reciprocity. The American philosopher defines society as “fair system of cooperation,” where cooperation includes “the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms each participant may reasonably accept, and sometimes should accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity, or mutuality: all who do their part as the recognized rules require are to benefit as specified by a public and agreed-upon standard” (^{Rawls, 2001, p. 6}). These are part of the basic structure of society which should be ruled by its two principles of justice. Therefore, cooperation implies reciprocity, where to receive a certain benefit, you must ‘do your own part in the cooperative scheme.’ This notion of individual-level contribution as a requirement to partake in society precedes any account of reciprocity present in the difference principle. Moreover, Rawls assumes cooperation with a productivist bias: “Social cooperation, we assume, is always productive, and without cooperation there would be nothing produced and so nothing to distribute” (^{Rawls, 2001, p. 61}). Beyond what can be considered a productive contribution, it is enough for now to claim that in Rawls cooperation has a productive nature. Therefore, we can argue that to be entitled to the benefits guaranteed by the first principle of justice - the one which governs the distribution of the index of primary goods, and which could include a UBI - one has to accept the requirement to contribute productively.

In a similar account to Rawls, Stuart White endorses a view of cooperative justice, where reciprocity is central: “those who willingly enjoy the economic benefits of social cooperation have a corresponding obligation to make a productive contribution, it they are so able, to the cooperative community which provides these benefits” (^{White, 2003, p. 52}). In doing so, White is referring to Rawls’ account of cooperation, and therefore supporting a conception of justice where the distribution of assets is conditioned by our productive participation. Of course we can discuss what counts as productive participation and White has done it often (^{White, 2016, p. 8}), influenced by ^{Atkinson’s notion of “participation income” (Atkinson, 1996}). Moreover, he has also taken the principle of “contribution according to one’s ability” (^{White, 2003, p. 60}). But White’s account of the reciprocity requirement stems not necessarily from a generalized norm, as in the sociological debate mentioned, but from a notion of mutual respect, where we are obliged to contribute because, in doing so, we pay respect to our fellow citizen (^{White, 2003}). Contributing becomes necessary for mutual respect, and for satisfying the requirement of justice. Therefore, violating reciprocity by non-contributing (assuming we are an able-bodied citizen) is almost automatically exploitative because 1) cooperation is considered from a productive standpoint (even if not work-centered) and especially because 2) it is assumed that the funding of a high-level UBI will partly come from the products of social cooperation. Since we are not here discussing the funding schemes of UBI,³ we will be focusing our analysis on the notion of cooperation and discuss how a UBI is said to be against the spirit of reciprocity, by allowing individuals to evade their obligations to contribute, as opposed to other social assistance programs, namely activation or workfare policies.⁴

Before moving on to the evidence experiments can give us, it is worth mentioning those who have tried to overcome the reciprocity objection. One of these accounts is to be found in the reply to Stuart White by Philippe ^{Van Parijs (1997}). The latter claims that more important than grounding our discussion on the distinction between what is a direct result of cooperation, and hence cannot be distributed unconditionally, we should focus on the value of these assets, and how many are in scarce supply. If we look at value in scarcity, we will find a stronger argument for sharing the value of assets universally and unconditionally. So, Van Parijs does not deny that reciprocity exists but focuses on the notion of entitlement as a more important principle to govern the distribution of income (^{Van Parijs, 1997, p. 4}). However, this account disregards reciprocity, and one could argue that, when implementing a UBI, reciprocal expectations can prove to have a bigger relevance, undermining public acceptance of the policy. The intuition that this might be the case should inform our discussion, even if in theory we could be moved by an entitlement-based principle, and not a contribution-based one.

Another contribution by Simon Birnbaum argues it would be too difficult to identify the small minority that did not in effect contribute in an economic or political way. By widening the scope of contribution, conditionality would become difficult to implement. The author’s case against a “thick, employment-centered” account of reciprocity, goes further than White’s or Atkinson’s account (^{Birnbaum, 2012}). Atkinson supported a “participation income” as opposed to an unconditional one, claiming that participation, rather than employment, should be considered as a condition to receive benefits. Participation would include work and self-employment, but also training and education and care work (Atkinson, 1996, pp. 68-69). While this is already a broader conception of contribution, Birnbaum goes further. Much of the activities Atkinson considers are still of an economic nature, even if not employment-related, and for Birnbaum, “economic cooperation needs to build on stable political cooperation” (^{Birnbaum, 2012, p. 75}). Therefore, we should not exclude anyone from the realm of social justice, based on a notion of cooperation that disentangles economic contribution from the political one. Since economic production is interdependent with politics, we should not exclude those who in theory simply contribute to one side of the equation (^{Birnbaum, 2012, p. 75}). The question here is hence what is included in “the realm of social justice,” that allows political participation to be a satisfying criterion, without economic cooperation. His second argument is like Van Parijs’ principle of entitlement. By claiming a principle of wealth-sharing through “taxing a set of “reciprocity-free” resources [unearned resources] UBI would not violate reciprocity” (^{Birnbaum, 2012, p. 82}). Therefore, first Birnbaum expands the view of contribution to accommodate UBI under reciprocity, and secondly, he respects reciprocity and argues for funding that avoids breaking the requirement of individual-level contribution.

These accounts are relevant for our discussion, inasmuch as they all consider reciprocity as an important norm. Particularly, Birnbaum’s and White’s discussions on what is a relevant contribution allow us to look into the evidence of basic income experiments in the incentives to work and productive activity, but also in terms of political participation. It also leads to the discussion on how basic income can increase our individual and collective “investment” in spheres of activity outside employment. We will now look at experiments having in mind an expanded notion of contribution.

Reciprocity and basic income experiments

We can confidently state the existence of reciprocal obligations. We know they are related to social status, exchanges, and mechanisms of social cohesion. Therefore, considering reciprocity when reflecting on implementing a policy such as UBI is important. It can also contribute to strengthening the theoretical discussion. Experiments can tell us if some of our concerns do in fact take place. But we first need to assert the relevance of looking at experiments.

Experiments are important because they give us information on research designs, hint at the type of positive and negative outcomes of implementing UBI, and can inform us about the political attitude (^{Wispelaere, Halmetoja and Pulkka, 2018}; ^{Pulkka, 2019}; ^{Santens, 2019}).⁵ They can also impose challenges, where some are intrinsic to any social experiment while others are specific to UBI.⁶ These include issues such as the sample size, usually too small to generalize, or too focused on segments of the population; the time frame, which tends to be very limited to consolidate our understanding overall impacts of a policy; the media effect, which can bias the results through the way the evidence is communicated; the difficulty in assessing community effects; the streetlight effect, which biases the outcomes that we will analyze, given our preferences and prior opinions (^{Standing, 2017}; ^{Widerquist, 2018}), or even possible spillover effects from treatment to control groups and attrition biases when results are measured in the medium- to long-run, both difficult to rationalize.⁷

Furthermore, and as pointed out by a World Bank report (World Bank Group, 2020, p. 102), we do not have experiments with a “pure” UBI. Most experiments implemented so far, are either partly means-tested or have degrees of conditionality. Therefore, enlarging the scope of evidence we resort to, including minimum income schemes, is acceptable. Minimum income schemes have also been extensively studied and have been implemented for many years, in entire countries, and as policies and not experiments, which means the evidence collected on outcomes is less biased by the challenges to experiments presented above (^{Williamson, 1974}; ^{Benarrosh, 2003}; ^{Barreiros, 2017}; ^{Rodrigues, 2010}; ^{Sykes et al., 2015}).

That is why, in this paper, we will be considering the most common experiments that fall within the “umbrella” of basic income experiments. Most of them have in common the fact that they have at least one treatment group (when the method used was a randomized control trial) that received a guaranteed grant. These include pilots for Unconditional Basic Income namely: the Namibia BIG project (2008-2009) a saturation study where 9 euros (the food poverty line) was granted monthly to 1000 inhabitants of the village of Otjivero, the experiments in India, namely in Madhya Pradesh (2008-2013), and the experiment taking place in Kenya, managed by Give Directly, namely the long-term experiment where 44 villages, amounting to 4,966 people are receiving roughly 0.75 US dollar per adult per day, delivered monthly for 12 years. Apart from that, it will also include guaranteed income schemes, where there is means-testing such as the Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED) - (2019-2020) - in Stockton California, where 125 randomly selected residents received 500 US dollars per month for 24 months. The SEED experiment is an initiative that led to the founding of Mayors for Guaranteed Income; also include the Negative Income Tax experiments that took place in North America in the 60s and 70s in different states, targeting both lower-income populations, but also targeting rural populations and single-parent families. Lastly, it will include the experiments that have proliferated in Europe, where a form of guaranteed income, targeted at lower-income people or long-term unemployed, is tested. These include the Utrecht experiment (2017), where 750 beneficiaries of the social insertion income received a cash grant, with three different experimental conditionals, where only one experienced no obligation to find work, the B-MINCOME experiment in Barcelona (2017-2019), where for 24 months 1000 vulnerable households received individual cash grants in ten neighborhoods in Barcelona. It was designed to test the policy combining a monetary transfer with four active policies of social and labor inclusion or the famous Finnish basic income experiment (2017-2018), where 2000 individuals between 25 and 58 years old looking for work and receiving an unemployment benefit received an extra 560 EUR allowance, tax-free, and guaranteed, even if individuals found employment during that period.

A final note to mention that we will also include data from the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ Dividend, and data available on literature and resources aiming to compare or discuss the different experiments, their designs and their results (World Bank Group, 2020; ^{Widerquist, 2018}; ^{Merrill, Neves, & Laín, 2022}).⁸ As mentioned, the paper will also engage with existing studies on conditional minimum income schemes, particularly the Portuguese and French cases, given existing information on stigma (one of the phenomena that will be discussed when comparing this form of assistance with unconditional cash grants).

Moreover, we will guide our discussion around four questions:

What do experiments tell us?

There is ample evidence of basic income experiments implemented so far. To discuss the four dimensions presented above, we will be using the information available about the most well-known basic income experiments, existing reports surveying experimental evidence, but also reports on the impact of minimum income in European countries.⁹

On work incentives. A recent report from the World Bank surveyed results from universal basic income experiments and argued that an unconditional income floor generated no general significant disincentive to work (World Bank Group, 2020, p. 103). Particularly, the report points out the fact that when indeed those effects were found (mild ones) such as in the Iranian cash grant, they were the result of a choice to continue school instead of working, an effect observed in people between the age of 20-29 (^{World Bank Group, 2020, p. 103}). Some experiments reported increases, such as the Madhya Pradesh experiment, where there was a job increase in the agrarian sector, positions which were filled by former part-time workers. Moreover, a decrease in bonded labor was detected and entrepreneurial economic activity, namely the one performed by women, increased (^{Davala et al., 2015}). In fact, increases in entrepreneurial activity seem to be common across experiments taking place in the Global South, such as the ones that took place in Namibia and Kenya (^{Haarmann et al., 2009}; ^{Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016}; ^{Osterkamp, 2013}). In cases where labor intensity decreased mildly, like the Alaska Permanent Fund, by choosing more part-time arrangements, this was linked to a shift in time used towards other valued activities (World Bank Group, 2020).

This conclusion is a step forward, considering the debate that started in the 80s regarding the reported impacts of the Negative Income Tax experiments that took place in North America. Several articles at the time, reported a decrease in hours worked (^{Keeley and Robins, 1979}), and while for some, they signal the alarming negative impact of basic income on incentives to work, there is reason to reconsider these results. On the one hand, as Robert A. Moffit pointed out, the reduction in hours worked was the result of a decrease in overtime or it represented a shift towards valuable activities, such as younger workers choosing to back to school (^{Moffitt, 1981}, p. 3). On the other hand, the several limitations of the study, like the fact that they did not conduct an analysis on the demand side of the labor equation, could have biased the results, to a point where the reduction in hours worked might have been smaller and the effect on poverty larger (^{Widerquist, 2005}).

In what way do these results contribute to our understanding of reciprocity as requiring an obligation to work? Firstly, they fail to prove the theoretical concerns of the reciprocity-hard liners. In fact, no definitive negative effects on labor supply tend to be observed. Moreover, there is reported evidence that basic income can have positive impacts in reducing barriers to work: for single mothers, or families with children. This effect seems to be particularly strong for low-intensity work or poor households (^{Widerquist, 2005}; ^{Martinelli, 2017}). Interestingly, the reports of the Finnish experiment point in that direction, since a modest positive effect on employment was observed in families with children or where Finnish or Swedish was not the first language (^{Henley, 2020}). Therefore, basic income can be an effective policy to promote employment, particularly in vulnerable households. However, it should be noted that in wealthier countries, negative effects on employment, even if mild, should be expected. However, the inherent limitation to rigorously assessing these results can make it very difficult to establish a definite conclusion (^{Widerquist, 2018}; ^{Merrill, Neves and Laín, 2022}). Nonetheless, empirical evidence is weak: it was neither found that basic income has a negative effect on employment, and even when those effects were found, no evidence supported the idea that it would cause some segment of the population to withdraw from the labor force altogether, as pointed out by Karl Widerquist (2004, p. 27). It should also be noted that modest decreases in labor supply might still be in tandem with the requirements of reciprocity. In fact, people might be able to avoid working more hours than what is required of them by the obligations of reciprocity. Of course, the perceptions of those norms in public and political discourse can contribute to the “appearance of exploitation” (^{Murphy and Nagel, 2002}), hence resulting in diminished support for the policy, grounded on the duties of reciprocity.

A second point should be considered when discussing work incentives. UBI has the potential to be emancipatory: by receiving it people are given the opportunity to choose welfare-enhancing jobs and to refuse “dirty jobs”. This effect was reported in the Mincome experiment, in Canada, where the impact on wages was positive since the additional income reduced the threat of exiting of labor market as mentioned in the World Bank Report (^{World Bank Group, 2020, p. 108}). As the report shows, these effects can be observed when there is no conditionality on work as was the case in Mincome, but also in several other experiments (^{World Bank Group, 2020}, p. 108; 114). Therefore, it is interesting that, contrary to the theoretical debate, empirical evidence seems to show that implementing unconditional cash transfers can improve the overall conditions of workers.

On the perception about UBI. How do people look at unconditional cash transfers? And in what way are the perceptions like other welfare programs in place? These are all important questions since they help us understand whether people feel UBI is exploitative and unfair, particularly if we look at the notion of stigma. Stigma acts as a signaling of what we chose to call “negative-reciprocity feelings,” a notion that was introduced by ^{Gouldner when considering actions and feelings of revenge and “retaliation” (Gouldner, 1960}, p. 172). Social stigma happens when there is a “failure to reciprocate welfare assistance” (^{Barreiros, 2017}) or when there is a perception of that failure. Therefore, when stigma occurs, we could assume that there is a perception that the reciprocity norm is being broken. Moreover, stigmatization is defined as a negative perception, including lower respect and demeaning sentiments towards welfare recipients. It is also a generator of decreased self-respect of the beneficiaries. Even for Rawls, stigma is one characteristic, alongside solidarity, of the “social bases of self-respect,” one of the most important primary goods to be shared among citizens (Rawls, 2001, p. 60).

The notion of social stigma has been reported in studies on welfare assistance, either from the recipients’ point of view, where recipients of social benefits frequently reported feelings “of lack of self-respect and negative self-characterizations from participating in welfare” (^{Moffitt, 1983}) or even from society’s take on welfare recipients. As Mónica ^{Barreiros (2017}) points out, stigma is associated with welfare claims due to its connection with social norms of reciprocity, arising when we believe that net beneficiaries are getting more from the system than what they contribute to it. The presence of social stigma can hence be seen as empirical evidence of a reciprocity norm, and therefore reinforce a theoretical claim for a principle of justice as reciprocity. It is then important to assess how basic income can generate social stigma or not, vis-a-vis other welfare assistance programs.

Universalistic social policies can be seen as promoters of solidarity, whereas income-tested or targeted policies are seen as stigmatizing. Targeted and means-tested programs imply that the beneficiary must be eligible, meaning they need to prove that either they are unemployed, have an income below a given threshold, or provide evidence of job search. The candidate must prove their socioeconomic and vulnerability status. This can yield significant injustices. For one, in “welfare to work” interactions, recipients are income-dependent on both the social assistance and the welfare office. Moreover, they are particularly “vulnerable to exercises of arbitrary power” given that they are “inclined to act in accordance with (their expectations of) the preferences of the welfare officer or work supervisor in order not to lose their benefits of last resort, as well as when they have a legal right to act differently” (^{Eleveld, 2020}, p. 265).¹⁰ Finally, such bureaucratic procedures often require that the social worker must analyze and monitor the recipients, which means the community will also most likely be aware of who is in welfare assistance. Having to disclaim information to prove our socioeconomic status can lead to negative sentiments, such as shame, as Jonathan ^{Wolff, points out, calling it incidences of “shameful revelation” (Wolff, 1998}).

The theoretical debate seems to be supported by evidence. For example, a study in Portugal, aggregating conclusions from interviews conducted with social workers, found that the beneficiaries felt stigmatized because of the mechanisms of “Social Inclusion Income”.¹¹ The same study also found that in the group of people who were using the benefit temporarily, the higher levels of stigma felt by the individual can jeopardize their attitude towards his so-called “inclusion” plan (^{Rodrigues, 2010}). Studies by Yolande Benarrosh in France also agree with the idea of stigmatization jeopardizing the attitude towards work and inclusion (Benarrosh, 2003). Beyond the moral cost of stigmatization, the evidence implies that conditional programs generate social stigma. Therefore, imposing conditions on welfare reinforces and promotes negative-reciprocity attitudes. One can argue that it simply confirms the prevalence of a certain reading of the norm of reciprocity. But when literature points to the role that social stigma can have in contributing to fragile social policies (^{Calnistsky, 2016}) and backlash against redistributive policies, one can question how social stigma can be detrimental to a certain conception of justice as reciprocity, in an egalitarian sense. Instead of promoting a system of shared benefits and burdens, it undermines it, by fuelling backlash against any redistributive policy that could be seen as an equalizer of opportunities and means.

When it comes to unconditional cash transfers, the evidence on stigmatization is still scarce, especially due to the larger focus that has been given to work incentives. However, there is some evidence from the negative income tax in Canada - the Mincome experiment. An analysis of the data collected from Dauphin, where all town residents were eligible for guaranteed annual income payments for three years,¹² showed that participants saw the payments through a “pragmatic lens, rather than the moralistic ones through which welfare is viewed” (^{Calnistsky, 2016}). The pragmatic lens meant that recipients felt they were treated as “normal” people, and not welfare recipients, implying that there was no social stigma. Several accounts of the study seem to point in that direction, namely the qualitative aspects the beneficiaries mentioned - they felt “pride,” “allowed them to live at standards acceptable in the community” - but also the answers on how their life was altered or not - participants were less likely to avoid spending time in the community or to feel embarrassment or difficulties due to the Mincome, when compared with welfare recipients. The perception the recipients had of Mincome versus welfare was also staggering: they accepted Mincome to supplement their income, to have a safety net, or to participate in the experiment (pragmatic reasons), but refused welfare because they wanted to keep “their dignity,” because they were able to support themselves or because they consider welfare to be demeaning (moralistic perceptions) (Calnistsky, 2016, pp. 61-62). For Calnitsky, this points out a fundamental aspect of the Mincome experiment in how by sidestepping values on autonomy and work, Mincome as opposed to welfare was deemed acceptable (Calnistsky, 2016, p. 63). Interestingly, a similar result has been reported in the Barcelona B-MINCOME experiment, where both the framing of the experiment as a “European research project” but also the unconditional nature of the cash grant (in some of the treatment groups) seem to have contributed to recipients feeling “proud of taking part in the project,” feeling like they had a “voice,” rather than feeling stigmatized and/or excluded (^{Riutort et al., 2021}; ^{Laín, 2019}; ^{Merrill, Neves ad Laín, 2022}). Hence, evidence seems to suggest that conditionality, alongside monitoring and punitive mechanisms in social assistance, reinforces negative reciprocity feelings through social stigma. This can potentially contribute to decreased support for redistributive measures but also reduce the opportunities and self-respect of some of the most vulnerable people in society.

UBI and contribution. Finally, it is worth exlporing the role of UBI in promoting activities beyond employement. It asks whether UBI generates a trade-off: employment versus socially relevant activities, a discussion analogous to the idea of UBI as an opportunity to expand the “autonomous sphere,” defined by (^{Gorz, 1980}) and referred to by ^{Van Parijs (2010}).¹³ It also questions if UBI can have an impact beyond the trade-off: if it is a way to not only expand our notion of valuable contribution but also enable us to invest in such activities.

There is some evidence of UBI promoting shifts in activities. As mentioned, in the Alaska Permanent Fund, people reduced their paid work intensity by opting for a part-time arrangement and using the time towards other valued activities (^{World Bank Group, 2020}). In some cases, such as the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ Dividend, basic income seems to have allowed parents to reduce their work intensity, and instead devote more time to care work, namely for themselves, but also to be more attentive to their children’s education, mental health, and well-being (^{Merrill, Neves and Laín, 2022}).¹⁴ This evidence seems to support the first account of the trade-off: when granted a UBI, people might choose to reduce the number of hours in employment, to spend more time on other activities.

The evidence on community activity is scarce, thus less conclusive, particularly if we wish to assess if people continued working, but increased community engagement. In the Mincome experiment, people seem to have been more active in the community than people in welfare assistance (^{Calnistsky, 2016}). There is also evidence on the role UBI can have in improving social relations within a family and community, and in fostering political activity. The Longitudinal Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth conducted in North Carolina in the 90s was meant to assess the mental health of low-income children. When a casino opened in the region and provided a portion of its profits to part of those families, hence creating the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ Dividend, the experiment opened new avenues of research. One recent study by Randall ^{Akee et al. (2018}) looked for the effects of this same cash grant on the political turnout of the families and children in the study. It found the additional income increased poorer children’s voter turnout (when adults), while in the better-off families, the extra income had no effect. This effect was relevant for the children, but not for the parents. Therefore, the unearned income had a very positive effect on increasing civic engagement and social capital, by “in effect closing the participatory gap between high and low-income individuals of this rising generation” (Akee et al., 2018, p. 4). Of course, it is not the income per se responsible for the changing behavior, but rather the impact of the exogenous cash grant, on school attainment and the acquisition of social capital and skills throughout life (Akee et al., 2018, p. 5). The study suggests that a UBI can have a long-lasting impact on civic engagement namely, and particularly in mitigating the inequality of political participation, hence helping to shape more inclusive policies.

Finally, there is reported evidence, particularly in countries in the Global South, of how a basic income can impact community-led mobilization. In Namibia, participants created an elected “BIG Committee” of 18 members who were tasked with further mobilizing the community but also advising recipients on how to best spend their cash grant (^{Haarmann et al., 2009}, p. 37; ^{Merrill, Neves and Laín, 2022}, p. 144). In Madhya Pradesh, India, basic income allowed participants to stop borrowing from loan sharks and start resorting to family or neighbors. After the experiment ended, participants refused to get back to being exploited by money lenders, and as such organized themselves to persuade the non-profit who administered the basic income experiment, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), to establish a revolving fund to provide low-interest loans to farmers to buy seeds at the time of the sowing season. This further led to farmers themselves establishing a communitarian seed bank (^{Davala et al. 2015}).

Therefore, if we endorse a notion of contribution beyond employment, including care work, volunteering, community, and civic engagement, basic income can have a role in promoting socially relevant activities.