As razões que a razão desconhece: Penso, logo engano-me? (*)

 

Miguel M. Gonçalves (**)

Óscar F. Gonçalves (**)

 

 

RESUMO

Neste artigo realiza-se uma revisão dos estudos sobre análise de razões, desenvolvidos nas duas últimas décadas por Wilson et al. (cf., Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Este programa de investigação tem demonstrado de forma sistemática que a análise de razões acerca do nosso comportamento produz efeitos disfuncionais, reduzindo a congruência atitude (medida de auto-relato)-comportamento ou conduzindo a uma menor satisfação pós-escolha em bens de consumo.

São analisadas as propostas interpretativas desta disfuncionalidade, a possibilidade de interpretar estes resultados como uma função da desejabilidade social e o papel que as razões explicativas poderão ter na vida quotidiana.

Finalmente, é proposta uma re-interpretação dos resultados destes estudos a partir da distinção entre pensamento narrativo e pensamento paradigmático (Bruner, 1986).

 

Palavras-chave: Disfuncionalidade da análise de razões, congruência relatos verbais-comportamento, congruência atitude-comportamento.

 

 

ABSTRACT

In this article we review the studies concerned with reason analysis, developed in the last two decades by Wilson et al (cf., Wilson & Schooler, 1991). This research systematically demonstrates that behavioral reason analysis produces dysfunctional effects by reducing the congruency between attitudes (verbal report measure) and behaviors. The disfunctionality of reason analysis also produces less satisfaction after choosing products for consumption. We analyse the interpretations of this dysfunctionality. Foremost, the possible interpretations of these results could be a product of social desirability and the function that explanatory reasons may have in daily life. Finally, we propose a re-interpretation of the results of these studies based on the distinction between paradigmatic thinking and narrative thinking (Bruner, 1986).

Key-words: Dysfunctionality of reason analysis, verbal report-behavior congruency, attitude-behavior congruency.

 

 

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(*) A correspondência sobre este artigo deverá ser enviada para: Miguel M. Gonçalves, Departamento de Psicologia, Universidade do Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4709 Braga Codex, Portugal. Fax: 053678987, Telefone: 053604240. e-mail: mgoncalves@iep.uminho.pt

(**) Universidade do Minho, Departamento de Psicologia.