Desenvolvimento do raciocínio condicional e modelos mentais (*)

 

Ana Cristina Quelhas (**)

Csongor Juhos (**)

Jorge Senos (**)

Teresa Almeida Rocha (**)

 

 

RESUMO

De acordo com a teoria dos modelos mentais (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) a interpretação de uma frase condicional, do tipo Se p, então q, gera os modelos iniciais:

p q

... em que os três pontos representam um modelo sem conteúdo explícito. A representação completa da condicional compreende os seguintes modelos explícitos:

p q

¬p ¬q

¬p q

em que “¬” serve aqui para indicar a negação. A partir deste quadro teórico, e da suposição de que uma inferência é tanto mais difícil quanto maior o número de modelos explícitos que requer, é possível colocar hipóteses sobre diferenças no nível de dificuldade nas inferências com os quatro silogismos condicionais.

Na experiência que iremos descrever pretende-se testar essas hipóteses em sujeitos de diferentes níveis etários (8, 11 e 15 anos). A partir dos resultados obtidos serão adiantadas hipóteses sobre o progressivo desenvolvimento da capacidade de representar os três modelos mentais de interpretação das condicionais.

Serão ainda realçadas diferenças na resposta dos sujeitos que derivam de diferenças no conteúdo das frases condicionais. Um último objectivo, de carácter exploratório, prende-se com a comparação das respostas em sujeitos de duas nacionalidades (Portuguesa e Húngara).

Assim, o grupo de variáveis independentes define um plano factorial misto 2X3X2X4 (Nacionalidade X Idade X Conteúdo X Silogismo), dado que a última variável é intra-sujeitos.

Palavras-chave: Silogismos condicionais, Teoria do modelos mentais, Desenvolvimento do raciocínio.

 

 

ABSTRACT

According to the mental models theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) the interpretation of a conditional sentence of the kind If p then q creates the initial models:

p q

... where the three dots represent a model without explicit content. The complete representation of the conditional has the following explicit models:

p q

¬p ¬q

¬p q

where “¬” is used to indicate a negation. Based on the mental models, which advocate that the greater the number of explicit models needed, the more difficult is an inference, it is possible to consider hypotheses about the differences in the difficulty level in inferences with the four conditional syllogisms.

In the experiment described, our goal is to test those hypotheses in subjects of different ages (8, 11 and 15 years old). Based on the results, we present hypotheses about the progressive development of the capacity to represent the three mental models in conditional sentences interpretation.

We also want to emphasise the differences in the answers of the subjects, that are a consequence of the differences in the content of the conditional sentences. Our last goal is to explore the differences in the answers by subjects of two nationalities (Portuguese and Hungarian).

Thus, the group of independent variables defines a mixed factorial design 2X3X2X4 (Nationality X Age X Content X Syllogism), since the last variable is within subjects.

Key words: Conditional syllogisms, Mental models theory, Development of reasoning.

 

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(*) Resultados desta experiência foram parcialmente apresentados no Workshop sobre Deductive reasoning and strategies (Bruxelas, Março de 1998) e na IXth European Conference on Developmental Psychology (Grécia, Setembro de 1999).

(**) Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, Lisboa.