Introduction

The escalating wars of national liberation in Southern Africa from the early 1960s and the 1970s led to spontaneous emigration of both African nationalists and ordinary refugees from white minority‑controlled territories of Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa (Namibia), South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Apart from Tanzania and other independent African states, African activists fled to Zambia and settled in the country’s capital, Lusaka, where they benefited from the hospitality afforded by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) government led by the first republican president, Kenneth Kaunda. For members of the liberation movements,¹ Lusaka became an important political and public sphere for the anti‑colonial movement in Southern Africa. Apart from embracing the city as their second home for many years, African nationalists embraced the safe political environment to collaborate and forge new ideas about ways of organising armed resistance with fellow Africans living in exile, and they also took advantage of Kaunda’s hospitality to establish contacts and consolidate ties with Lusaka‑based foreign diplomats sympathetic to their cause. Lusaka also served as a crucial site for the recruitment of fighters as well as a major transit centre for the activists who sought military training in Tanzania, East Africa and beyond in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Far East (^{Houston, 2013}).

While there is substantial and well‑established academic research on liberation struggles in Southern Africa, sufficient evidence also demonstrates a remarkable shift in scholarship on the subject over the last two decades. Previous accounts on liberation movements emphasised the material conditions which gave rise to the armed resistance movements. There is consensus among the early writers that liberation movements emerged as a response to popular discontent engendered by repressive policies of colonial states (^{Bragança & Wallerstein, 1982}; ^{Gibson, 1972}; ^{Houser, 1989}). As wars of national liberation gained momentum in Southern Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the white minority regimes cracked down on African nationalists by arresting and incarcerating political leaders, while several others escaped and established external missions and bases in sympathetic foreign countries where they continued to organise armed resistance. Thus, over the past decade, an appreciable collection of studies has emerged, which underscores the significance of state and non‑state actors in the liberation of Southern Africa. This is because transnational actors extended vital material, military and financial support to the liberation movements which were essential to the successful persecution of the liberation wars (^{Chongo, 2016}a; ^{Eriksen, 2000}; ^{Mgadla, 2008}; ^{Morapedi’, 2012}; ^{Morgensteine, 2003}; ^{Ndlovu, 2013}; ^{Oitsile, 2010}; ^{Osei‑Hwedie, 1998}; ^{Sellstrom, 2002}; ^{Temu & Tembe, 2014}).

In the recent past, however, a shift in the trajectory has occurred. Academics have been preoccupied with analysing transnational histories of liberation movements and the lived experiences of exiled communities (^{Alexander et al., 2017}; ^{Macmillan, 2009}, ²⁰¹³; ^{Sapire, 2009}; ^{Williams, 2015}, ²⁰¹⁷). There is growing unanimity among scholars about the need to interrogate the interactions within and among liberation movements as well as with the host governments and other external actors. Such analysis, it has been argued, “reveals lasting and sometimes surprising legacies that have too often been eclipsed by dominant national histories” (Alexander et al., 2017, p. 1). Other writers have further pushed the frontiers of academic research on the exile experiences of liberation movements. For instance, Michael G. ^{Panzer (2013}) has demonstrated how Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) imposed a “paradigm of state‑building” on thousands of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania and liberated zones in northern Mozambique by establishing institutions and social services. In this way, the nationalist movement “transitioned from a Liberation Front of militant fighters into a proto‑state with aspects of governmental authority” (Panzer, 2013, p. 6). Using photographic evidence and oral testimony, among other sources, Justin Pearce examined Camalundu and Caculama, the two prominent Angolan military training camps that housed Cuban military advisors and various liberation movements to reconstruct the exiled life of guerrilla fighters (^{Pearce, 2022}). More recently, scholars have adopted another ground‑breaking approach to the study of liberation struggles in Southern Africa by essentially focusing on sites or places where African nationalists and representatives of Third World governments converged. These studies have typically identified crossing points in imperial or revolutionary capitals and their eastern connections (^{Burton, 2019}; ^{Byrne, 2016}; ^{Ellis, 2014}; ^{Lisson, 2008}; ^{Mabeko‑Tali, 2020}; ^{Roberts, 2016}, ²⁰²¹; ^{Saunders et al., 2019}).

Using Zambian archival sources, oral interviews with former UNIP and government officials, and some documentary sources, this article examines the role and significance of Lusaka in the struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa from the 1960s to the late 1970s. The study is not necessarily a description of Lusaka city as a geographical entity but rather focuses on the political space or sphere that allowed for the flow and movements of people, materials, information and ideas. Building on George Roberts’s conception of Dar es Salaam as a “Cold War city” where “diverse national, transnational and international political dynamics intersected” (^{Roberts, 2016}, p. 18), this study argues that similarly Lusaka was a major political capital of the anti‑colonial resistance in the sub region throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It not only hosted military bases and training camps for guerrilla fighters as well as residential accommodation in various townships, but also accorded office spaces to political representatives of the liberation movements at the African liberation centre. The presence of many foreign nationalists and the unauthorised movement of arms, sometimes used by members of the liberation movements to shoot at each other during internecine fighting (as was the case within Zimbabwe African People’s Union - ZAPU during the early 1970s and Zimbabwe African National Union - ZANU in the mid‑1970s), often increased tension and heightened the sense of insecurity around the city prompting the Zambian leadership to enforce strict control over the operations of the Lusaka based liberation movements.² The city of Lusaka also often served as a site of intense diplomatic activities as it hosted international conferences including the 1970 Non‑Aligned Conference and the 1979 Commonwealth Summit, among others. The significance of such conferences was not only because they attracted many heads of states, foreign diplomats, representatives of liberation movements and international solidarity organisations, but they also reflected Kaunda’s attempt to galvanise global solidarity towards the struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa.

1. Pre‑independence flights into exile

During an oral interview with Jabulani Sithole and Bernard Magubane in October 2001, Justice Mpanza, an African National Congress (ANC) activist described how he, along with fellow Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) recruits, left South Africa in 1962 on their journey into exile. They crossed the border into Botswana (then Bechuanaland) and reached Livingstone in Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) via Kazungula. In Livingstone, the activists were received by UNIP officials led by Kenneth Kaunda and subsequently allowed to board the train on their next journey to Lusaka. Upon arrival in Lusaka, Mpanza narrated how they were detained by the British colonial police. However, he escaped from the immigration building and was whisked away by Mungoni Liso, the Secretary of Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC), led by Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula. Mpanza remembered how, after many of his colleagues had also escaped arrest, Kaunda and Nkumbula organised trucks which transported them to the Tanganyika border on their way to Dar es Salaam (^{Houston, 2013}, pp. 13-14).

Mpanza’s reminiscences reflect the arduous experiences of many ANC recruits who left South Africa and set their sights northwards, to the newly independent state of Tanzania where they hoped to obtain military training. The pre‑independence flight into exile was not unique to MK recruits. As early as 1963, ZAPU also had already started recruiting and sending cadres for military training to the Soviet Union, China and North Korea such that by 1965, ZAPU had trained 140 militants but could not deploy them for internal assignment in Rhodesia due to lack of arms and other relevant materials.³ During their journey northwards, guerrilla recruits transited Lusaka when the town was controlled by the British colonial police, yet what helped nationalists like Mpanza and other recruits navigate through this perilous “route to exile”, was the friendly attitude shown by Northern Rhodesian nationalists towards fellow Africans, who regularly escaped arrest and detention by white minority governments in Southern Africa. The willingness by UNIP and NRANC officials to assist African comrades was premised on the long‑standing cooperation established among the anti‑colonial movements in Africa prior to independence including via the Pan‑African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa founded in 1958 as a platform on which African nationalists in Southern and East Africa campaigned to end white rule in these parts of the continent (^{Mbughuni, 2014}). Although African activists were confronted by constant threats of arrest, detention and deportation from the British colonial authorities during the dangerous transit through Lusaka, they were fully aware of UNIP’s anti‑colonial stance and its readiness to render assistance. In contrast to the period prior to independence when UNIP and ANC in Northern Rhodesia clandestinely assisted Southern African nationalists, Zambia’s attainment of independence offered numerous opportunities for the activists, as Lusaka’s support became formalised and institutionalised in the country’s domestic policies.

Situated in the south‑central part of Zambia, Lusaka, the country’s capital city, came into existence as a direct result of the British South Africa Company’s anxiety to help meet the costs of administering its vast and sparsely populated Trans‑Zambesia territories (^{Rothman, 1972}, p. 3). It lies in an area taken over from the local chiefs in the 1890s in the course of constructing Northern Rhodesia. In 1924, the Company handed over control of the territory to the British Colonial Office, and Lusaka became Northern Rhodesia’s capital in 1935. In the coming years, the city was to feature prominently in the anti‑colonial movement. It was not only where the NRANC was founded in 1948, but also, following the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, Lusaka, along with other railway towns and mining areas of the Copperbelt (^{Meebelo, 1977}; ^{Rotberg, 1966}, pp. 124-134), became key centres of the civil disobedience movement which led to the dismantling of the Federation in 1963 and subsequently, the creation of Zambia as an independent state. By 1965, Lusaka had emerged as an important centre of anti‑colonial resistance in the sub‑region. The city welcomed and supported thousands of African nationalists who adopted armed resistance as the only viable and legitimate strategy of political transformation in neighbouring white minority ruled territories of Southern Africa.

Prior to the rise of Lusaka as a key centre for armed resistance movements in Southern Africa, there were pioneering and leading cities that championed the anti‑colonial movement on the African continent. After the end of World War II, the primary hubs of the anti‑colonial political movements in Africa were centred around cities in the northern, western and eastern parts of the continent. In his recent study, Jeffrey James Byrne referred to Algiers, the Algerian capital under Ahmed Ben Bella, as the “Mecca of Revolution” where various revolutionaries from the Third World countries would often meet, hold discussions, build up networks and study the Algerian experiment of revolutionary decolonisation (Byrne, 2016). Burton talked about how “Cold War diplomats, anti‑colonial activists, guerrillas, students and refugees flocked to Cairo, Accra and Conakry in the late 1950s as well as Dar es Salaam, Brazzaville and Algiers in the 1960s” (Burton, 2019, p. 26; see also ^{Tekle, 1988}, p. 50). These revolutionary African capitals played a prominent pioneering role by extending diplomatic, material and military assistance to numerous liberation movements from the entire African continent. They also hosted many international conferences in solidarity with the liberation struggles in Africa. Amare Tekle particularly demonstrated how Cairo subsequently became the mecca of many African nationalist leaders who were given access to Radio Cairo with a view to mobilising their peoples in the anti‑colonialist struggle (^{Tekle, 1988}, p. 50).

Similarly, Jeffrey S. Ahlman described Ghana’s independence as a “watershed moment in twentieth‑century Africa”, which represented an “idealized path to African self‑rule” (2011, p. 24). As a result, “African and non‑African radicals and activists alike trekked to the Ghanaian capital of Accra where they sought to take part in what many saw as an emerging continent‑wide liberation movement” (^{Ahlman, 2011}, p. 24). Kwame Nkrumah made the struggle for African independence an article of national faith by extending financial and material aid to liberation movements and by sponsoring and hosting conferences aimed at exposing and denouncing colonialism and promoting the right of Africans to self‑determination (^{Tekle, 1988}, p. 50). For instance in 1958, Nkrumah hosted the Conference of Independent African States and the All‑Africa Peoples’ Conference in Accra. The two conferences became precursors of several such meetings in other African capitals, which subsequently led to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 with the goal of eliminating colonialism from the African continent as one of its fundamental objectives (^{Rossi, 1974}).

2. Why did Lusaka support liberation movements?

The establishment of the OAU and its anti‑colonial project coincided with Zambia’s independence and was to influence how Lusaka defined its foreign policy. As early as January 1965, Kaunda set the tone, defined the basic attitudes, and spelt out the guiding principles which were to govern Lusaka’s approach to international issues. He stressed that “we must do all in our power to see that our less fortunate neighbours in [Southern] Africa come to enjoy these privileges of freedom and unity which we have won for ourselves”.⁴ Re‑affirming Lusaka’s stance, Kaunda emphasised that:

Under our [foreign] policy […] we cannot hold our heads high before the rest of the world unless we take our full part in helping those of our brothers and sisters [in Southern Africa] currently struggling to free themselves from racial oppression and minority exploitation. We shall continue to give them all the support we can.⁵

Kaunda’s stance on Southern Africa was clear: Lusaka would support liberation movements in their quest to secure black majority rule in Southern Africa. Consequently, Kaunda welcomed liberations movements and allowed them to establish operational bases in Lusaka,⁶ but the commitment to supporting liberation wars did not take place in a vacuum. It was influenced by international, regional and local factors.

One of the key international factors which influenced Zambia’s leaders to assist liberation movements was Pan-Africanism. As an ideology and political movement, Pan-Africanism first emerged as a manifestation of fraternal solidarity among Africans in the diaspora during the eighteenth century. It was originally conceived by Henry Sylvester‑Williams, a prominent lawyer from Trinidad, but after his death, the Pan‑African concept remained dormant until it was revived by W. E. B. Du Bois after World War II. Du Bois animated Sylvester‑Williams’ original ideal of Pan‑Africanism and broadened its perspective. Between 1919 and 1945, Du Bois was largely responsible for organising five international congresses and for formulating their programmes and strategy along the path of non‑violent positive action (^{Padmore, 1961}, p. 117).

While Du Bois conceived the Pan-African movement as an “aid to the promotion of national self‑determination among Africans under African leadership” (Padmore, 196, p. 128), Marcus Garvey, on the other hand, looked upon Africa as a place for settling black people in the diaspora. His “Back to Africa Movement” and the idea of a “United Africa” became a key feature of Pan-Africanism (see ^{Ajala, 1973}, p. 101). Du Bois and Garvey’s pioneering roles in the development of Pan‑Africanism and their ardent desire to help advance the emancipation of Africa reverberated inside the continent and after 1945, influenced African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Jomo Kenyatta, and later Ben Bella, Julius Nyerere, Patrice Lumumba, Ahmed Boumedienne and Kenneth Kaunda. Nkrumah and Toure, in particular, became the unrivalled champions of Pan-Africanism in the African political arena (Ajala, 1973, p. 106). After World War II, it became evident that Pan-Africanism was developing from a protest movement by people of African descent in the diaspora into an instrument of African nationalist movement fighting colonial rule, as it provided the political climate that formed the background to the creation of the OAU and the Liberation Committee (^{Tekle, 1988}).

To appreciate how it influenced Lusaka’s regional policy, Pan-Africanism must be understood in the context of the OAU’s wider goals and principles enunciated in its Charter when it was created. Among other objectives, the OAU aimed to promote the unity and solidarity of African states, eliminate colonialism from the African continent, and work for the total emancipation of African territories that were still dependent (^{Rossi, 1974}). In the context of the Pan-Africanist goal of eradicating colonialism from Africa, Zambian leaders interpreted their own independence as incomplete and meaningless as long as Africans in neighbouring white minority‑ruled territories remained under colonial subjugation.⁷ Lusaka’s solidarity with armed resistance movements therefore had an ideological basis rooted in Pan-Africanism and reinforced the basic goals of the OAU at its inception. Apart from strict adherence to the OAU Charter, Kaunda and his governing elites in UNIP were also guided by the 1960 United Nation’s General Assembly Declaration on Decolonisation which endorsed the principle of the right of all people to self‑determination and independence.⁸

In deciding to render support to the liberation movements, Zambia’s leaders also took into account the country’s geopolitical position in Southern Africa. At the time of independence, the country was surrounded by white minority governments: the Portuguese colonial authorities administered Mozambique and Angola on the eastern and western frontiers, respectively, while to the southern border, the white settlers led by Ian Smith secured firm control of Rhodesia and were backed by the South African apartheid government which also governed South West Africa (Namibia). Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) to the north was still engulfed in political instability. The only independent states led by black governments were Malawi to the east and Tanzania to the north east. Zambian authorities were thus conscious of the potential risks to national security posed by the presence of hostile neighbouring states governed by white minority regimes. Given the undesirable geopolitical situation, concerns for the country’s security become an important consideration in the decision by the UNIP leaders to assist liberation movements in the region. They believed that as long as neighbouring territories remained under minority, oppressive, and racist rule, peace along the borders and ultimately, the country’s national security, would never be guaranteed.⁹ Lusaka’s attitude should, thus, be interpreted as an attempt to secure the country’s security interests.

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), proclaimed by Rhodesia’s Prime Minister, Ian Smith, in November 1965 was another related factor which heightened Zambia’s geopolitical concerns and reinforced its willingness to support armed resistance movements in Southern Africa. The attitude of white settlers towards the UDI contrasted sharply with the perceptions of Rhodesian Africans and Zambian leaders. Smith and his governing elite in the Rhodesian Front government conceived the UDI as an attempt to “preserve justice, civilisation, and Christianity” (^{Smith, 2008}, p. 106). For the Africans, the UDI symbolised white supremacy, consolidation of racial discrimination and a tragic attempt to impede constitutional progress towards black majority rule. The UDI and all it represented - political repression, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment of political opponents - galvanised their determination to adopt guerrilla war as the only viable option for securing black majority rule (^{Sibanda, 2005}, p. 95). Similarly in Zambia, the UDI represented a geopolitical disaster. Zambians interpreted it as an attempt to roll back the winds of decolonisation and, thus, a contradictory reality which could not co‑exist with the country’s independence. The UDI reinforced Zambia’s willingness to support armed resistance as a legitimate strategy of political transformation in Rhodesia and Southern Africa as a whole (^{Kanduza, 2005}, p. 5).

Economic considerations were also vital in shaping Lusaka’s policy towards Southern Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular. At independence, Zambia inherited an economy developed as a crucial component of Southern Rhodesia’s economic system. The dominant economic links which existed between the two countries were forged during the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Northern Rhodesia exported labour to the agricultural and mining industries of Southern Rhodesia and provided a huge market for its manufactured products.¹⁰ Northern Rhodesia also depended on its southern neighbour in almost all the key sectors of the economy, including transport and communication, energy and electricity. Due to intense political agitation by African nationalists demanding self‑rule, the British government dismantled the federation in 1963, and although Zambia emerged as an independent country, the pattern of its economic dependence on Rhodesia continued. The magnitude of its economic reliance was revealed in 1965 when Smith issued the UDI declaration, a development which polarised the political positions of the two countries.¹¹

Zambia’s leaders were convinced that the economy would perpetually remain vulnerable as long as unfriendly neighbouring white minority regimes continued to survive and control supply routes for the country’s import and export trade.¹² They decided to back armed resistance movements with the view of overthrowing white minority regimes and replacing them with friendly black governments which would potentially safeguard the export and import trade routes, and ultimately secure the country’s long‑term economic interests. Supporting the liberation struggles in the region was therefore seen as an attempt to ultimately secure and guarantee the country’s long‑term economic independence.¹³ Far from the popular perception and contrary to claims by some former Zambian leaders such as Bautis Frank Kapulu and Grey Zulu that Zambia backed armed struggles entirely on principle,¹⁴ available evidence suggests there was an economic dimension to the decision (^{Songiso, 1989}). Zambia supported liberation wars in order to secure its economic, political and security interests.¹⁵

3. Lusaka as a host city for political exiles

The willingness by Zambian leaders to host refugees and political exiles from neighbouring white ruled territories confirmed Lusaka’s significance in the struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa. The context in which Zambian authorities accepted refugees must first be established. Shortly after attaining independence, Zambia joined the United Nations (UN) and in 1969 ratified the UN Convention on Refugees - a universal instrument which not only governed the status of refugees, but also emphasised the deep concern and desire by member states to establish common standards for their treatment.¹⁶ Zambian authorities were careful to distinguish between various categories of refugees who came into the country as this determined how they dealt with them. They often recognised two categories of refugees: firstly, the leaders of liberation movements designated as political party organisers and the rank‑and‑file members of the nationalist movements who sought military training abroad; and secondly, the ordinary individuals who fled spontaneously in large numbers from the conflict zones prompted by armed struggle (^{Grundy, 1973}, p. 15).

This study focuses on the former category of refugees who identified themselves as political exiles who either escaped or were expelled from their countries of origin because of their involvement in political causes. These included the leaders and general members of various liberation movements. The Zambian government ensured the political exiles were accommodated in Lusaka particularly in townships such as Mtendere, Matero, Makeni, Chelston, Chilenje, Kanyama, Kabwata, Kamwala, Lilanda and Emmasdale.¹⁷ The significance of integrating foreign nationalists in local communities was to minimise the risk of being easily identified by the enemies unlike when they were accommodated in isolated areas. The idea of integrating freedom fighters among Zambian nationals was meant to enhance their protection, but complete security could not be guaranteed partly because the nationalist movements were often infiltrated by agents of the white minority regimes as liberation wars raged. Nonetheless, the local authorities in Lusaka ensured they paid rentals, electricity, water and telephone bills for the nationalist fighters. The entire arrangement was carried out clandestinely with tenancy registered under pseudo names for security reasons (^{Chirwa, 2013}).

Apart from accommodating political exiles, Lusaka also hosted the Liberation Centre, a key institution that supported the liberation wars in the sub‑region. The idea of establishing the liberation centre in Lusaka was subject to intense discussion by the Cabinet Office in the city as early as April 1965. The discussion centred on the urgency and importance of government acquisition of the appropriate premises which could be used to house office spaces for the liberation movements.¹⁸ However, after failed previous attempts, the government secured a new office building at Charter Welfare Hall in Lusaka and designated it as the Liberation Centre. The building was given to the liberation movements for use as their headquarters. The Lusaka‑based Liberation Centre worked closely with the Dar es Salaam‑based African Liberation Committee in matters of the screening, transiting, transportation and training of combatants, emphasising the strategic significance of the two cities in the struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa.¹⁹

4. Recruitment, training of combatants and insecurity of host state

Following the OAU’s establishment of training camps in Tanzania, one difficult undertaking by the liberation movements - especially in the early stages of the struggle - was to mobilise sufficient men for military training. Here, both Lusaka as a key recruitment and transit centre, and Dar es Salaam as an entry point to major training camps in Tanzania (and beyond to socialist countries), were to play a vital role in coordinating the processes and procedures. Once training camps in Tanzania were prepared to receive militants, the Liberation Committee in collaboration with the Liberation Centre instructed liberation movements to mobilise and send cadres for military training. In the initial stages, the principal sources of trainees were those recruited from among the host of refugees who crossed into Zambia. For instance, in 1967, ZANU’s Chief Representative in Dar es Salaam L. P. Chihota explained that:

We have resident in Zambia, Zimbabweans who number well over 40,000. Of these we can easily claim a membership of well over half. These people, perhaps more than the people in Zimbabwe are much more politicized and are a major source from which to get our fighters at least for this initial stage. We have in the past got some of our recruits from among these people but this was done unofficially [...].²⁰

The presence of large numbers of ordinary refugees in the country offered a vital and convenient source of recruiting cadres by the nationalist movements partly because refugees were considered to be more “politicised” than those who remained at home. However, since the cadres were sometimes forcefully recruited, Zambian authorities did not approve the process and consequently, banned it. They interpreted forced recruitment as kidnapping, an exercise which violated regulations governing operations of liberation movements in the country. The government often prohibited nationalist movements from coercing refugees ordinarily resident in the country to join the struggle as a method of enlisting members.²¹

The system of press ganging refugees as a form of recruitment for military training created general atmosphere of insecurity not least because the members of the liberation movements sometimes used firearms to force ordinary refugees to join the struggle. More so, the proliferation of unauthorised weapons aggravated the sense of insecurity especially where cadres sometimes brandished firearms. Zambian authorities were forced to revoke Noel Gabriel Mukono as a ZANU representative after he shot a local Zambian man with a pistol in Chieftainess Waitwika’s area in Isoka District for reasons unknown.²² The general insecurity engendered by the presence of thousands of cadres, some of whom were often armed and killed or threatened to kill their own members during intra and inter‑party violent conflicts which characterised liberation movements such as ZANU²³ and ZAPU,²⁴ ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC),²⁵ Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) (^{Williams, 2011}), compelled Zambian authorities to formulate rules and regulations to govern operations and maintain stricter control of the liberation movements. The rules and regulations included the following: i) only liberation movements officially recognised by the Zambian government were allowed to operate in the country; ii) recognised liberation movements were allowed to establish offices only in Lusaka except with special permission from the Office of the President; iii) office bearers and members of recognised liberation movements were not allowed to operate outside a radius of 10 miles from an authorised office without express permission from the Office of the President; iv) if permission to travel outside Lusaka by leaders of liberation movements had been granted, they were required to report to Mukuka Nkoloso, Kaunda’s personal representative at the Liberation Centre on departure and return; v) each liberation movement was allowed to maintain a maximum number of only six permanent staff at the Liberation Centre in Lusaka; vi) the number of permanent staff at any other authorised office was limited to a maximum of four people only; vii) liberation movements were not allowed to recruit for military training any foreign national ordinarily resident in Zambia without permission from the Office of the President; viii) all officials of the liberation movements operating in Zambia were required to disclose and submit full details of their names, dates and places of birth, family, national status and residential addresses to the Ministry of Home Affairs; ix) liberation movements were not allowed to appoint any individual as an official of a liberation movement in Zambia without permission from the Office of the President; x) liberation movements were required to submit applications for permission to hold both public and private meetings of more than ten persons to the Divisional or District Commander of Police of the area in which the meeting would take place - no such meetings were allowed to take place unless permission had been granted; xi) members of the liberation movements were reminded that they were not exempted from any of the provisions of the laws of Zambia and, as such, those who committed any offence were subject to trial and punishment in the same way as any ordinary citizen of Zambia.²⁶

The significance of these rules was that they helped the government regulate the operations of the liberation movements in the country. During the early years of the struggle, it was relatively easy for the government to enforce these rules, but as numbers of freedom fighters continued to increase and as the struggle gathered momentum, it became increasingly difficult to enforce the regulations.

Meanwhile, liberation movements also recruited cadres for military training directly from their countries of origin. For instance, ZAPU, ZANU, ANC and PAC often used middlemen who frequently demanded a lot of money to help cadres across the border through selected crossing points arranged by Zambian authorities along the Rhodesian-Zambian frontier.²⁷ Since Rhodesia’s border with Zambia became highly militarised after the UDI, and on account of the challenge posed by the Zambezi River as a natural obstacle, liberation movements often recruited and transported militants mainly by road from Zimbabwe and South Africa to Livingstone, and subsequently to Lusaka, Zambia, via Francistown in Botswana. As already pointed out earlier, Justin Mpanza, an ANC activist, and hundreds of his colleagues followed this arduous path to exile. Similarly, Angolan liberation movements such as the MPLA and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola often recruited many of its cadres for military training from among the host of refugees who crossed into the country across the vast Angolan-Zambian frontier (^{Neto, 2017}). Once the militants were in the country, Zambian authorities communicated to the Tanzanian government indicating the number of activists ready to proceed for military training in Tanzania. After formalities had been completed and cadres filled in recruitment forms, Tanzanian authorities permitted Lusaka to transport (or escort) the cadres to the Nakonde‑Tunduma border into Tanzania. The same process was followed in reverse order after militants finished military training in Tanzania. These procedures were repeated as cadres came in small groups at different times.²⁸

As soon as cadres were placed in camps, they were subjected to rigorous military training often lasting between four to six months. Under the supervision of Chinese military instructors recruited by the Liberation Committee as well as instructors seconded by the nationalist movements, the militants were trained in combat operations which included physical fitness, combat marching, and the handling of small arms, rocket launchers and light mortars. They were also trained in field engineering, plastic explosives, sabotage, ambushes, patrols, raids, defence and attack up to platoon level. Other forms of military training included drills in elementary knowledge of regular army tactics and modern guerrilla warfare strategies.²⁹

Outside Africa, military cadres often underwent training from socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In the Soviet Union, for instance, small groups of African nationalists, mainly from ZAPU, ANC, FRELIMO and MPLA, obtained training under Russian instructors in the use of explosives, arms, sabotage and guerrilla tactics (ambushes against vehicles and personnel, camouflage and spoor‑covering; basic radio communication and map reading). Other forms of training included military engineering, paramilitary training and intelligence. Most of this training took place in areas around Moscow such as Kakhovskaya and Cheryomushki. Training also took place in Simferopol and Odessa. Gregory F. Houston has documented the military bases and camps of the liberation movement by providing a detailed first‑hand account of the experiences of the militants who underwent military training in East Africa and the socialist countries in eastern Europe and the Far East (Houston, 2013). Among the early ZAPU members to obtain military training in the Soviet Union was Dumiso ^{Dabengwa (1995}). He later played a prominent role in the liberation struggle as ZAPU’s Chief of Military Intelligence.

In China, ZANU and PAC cadres obtained training in camps near Peking and Nanking. Josiah Tongogara was one of the prominent ZANU members who received military training in the Nanking Military Academy (^{Chung, 2006}, p. 130). He would later become ZANU’s Chief of Defence, commanding the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army forces, the military wing of ZANU. Under Chinese military instructors, the modes of training included revolutionary tactics, use of arms and explosives, sabotage techniques, communications and strategy. In order to support their investment in training the cadres, the Soviet Union and China provided military and material aid directly to the liberation movements and indirectly through the Liberation Committee.³⁰

5. Concept of “authentic” liberation movements

The question of which liberation movement qualified to send militants for military training became a controversial issue in the OAU and was partly exacerbated by the ideological rivalry between the Soviet Union and China which were competing for influence in Africa. African leaders established the Liberation Committee in 1963 with a specific mandate: i) to coordinate material and financial support donated to the liberation movements; ii) to give recognition and financial assistance to selected revolutionary movements; iii) to reconcile differences among rival insurgent groups so that they may present a united front; iv) to facilitate the formation of revolutionary alliances across national boundaries, and v) to publicise the struggle through diplomacy in international circles (^{El‑Khawas, 1977}). The degree of militancy and level of effectiveness on the battlefield were two important yardsticks which governed the Liberation Committee’s decision whether or not to recognise and support a particular liberation movement. Recognition was an important qualification for eligibility to receiving other forms of assistance from the Liberation Committee.³¹

The OAU via the Liberation Committee set the standard regarding which liberation movements were to be recognised and subsequently supported by the member states.³² However, the problem arose when liberation movements began to establish external networks to secure international assistance. While most of the liberation movements experienced serious internal quarrels often due to ethnic and personal differences, it seems their engagement with international actors, particularly the Soviet Union and China, served to reinforce the disputes which ultimately proved counterproductive for the liberation movements. For instance, against the backdrop of intense ZANU opposition, ZAPU secured the OAU’s recognition as a majority party representing the people of Zimbabwe and became the sixth nationalist movement to be identified as an “authentic” liberation movement after the ANC, SWAPO, FRELIMO, MPLA, and Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde. The concept of the “sole”, “official”, “legitimate” or “authentic” liberation movements was coined by the Soviet‑led Afro‑Asian Solidarity Organisation (AASO), a group which became prominent during the Cold War. It was the AASO which took the decision on which liberation movements should be regarded as “authentic” (^{Ebrahim, 1995}). The term “authentic six” was used to distinguish those liberation movements in Africa which the Russians considered as belonging in their sphere of influence, and enjoyed the support of the people in the respective countries of origin (^{Mutambara, 2014}, p. 98).

The Soviet backing of these nationalist movements through the AASO was partly aimed at spreading Soviet influence in Africa, where China equally vied for politico‑military dominance over liberation movements it supported such as ZANU and PAC. This underscores Tor Sellstrom’s assertion that the alliance of “authentic” liberation movements was not only a confirmation of long‑standing political and ideological affinities between the six movements and existing relations with the Soviet Union in the military field but also highly significant especially in the on‑going ideological struggle with China for influence in Africa (Sellstrom, 2002, p. 31). The significance of backing only “authentic” liberation movements was that the Soviet Union, and more generally the OAU, contributed towards heightening tensions among the members and reinforced the differences between competing nationalist organisations such as the ANC and PAC, and ZAPU and ZANU. However, the OAU’s recognition of ZAPU did not prevent individual member states from supporting ZANU (^{Nyangoni, 1978}, p. 7).

6. Lusaka and diplomacy by conference

The struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa was not only fought on the battlefield by foot soldiers in the armed resistance movements, but the fight was also played out diplomatically on the global scene. Here, the role of Zambian diplomacy was significant. At major international forums such as the OAU, United Nations, Commonwealth, and the Non‑Aligned Movement, Zambian diplomats consistently backed international resolutions and declarations aimed at expressing solidarity with liberation movements and routinely supported economic sanctions and various forms of boycotts designed to undermine white minority regimes in Southern Africa. They often played an active role in formulating many collective statements and consistently led efforts in mobilising leaders of other countries to support policies aimed at promoting the struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa.³³

Between 1968 and 1980, Kaunda hosted three major conferences in Lusaka dedicated mainly to the problem of white minority rule in Southern Africa. He first hosted the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States in April 1969, followed by the Third Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non‑Aligned Movement in September 1970, and finally the 22^nd Commonwealth Conference in August 1979. These conferences represented a major challenge to white minority regimes, but they also catapulted Kaunda into the world of international diplomacy, consolidating Lusaka’s position as a major hub of the anti‑colonial movement in the sub region.

7. Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, April 1969

Kaunda’s diplomatic effort in mobilising African leaders against the existing problem of white rule in Southern Africa was first expressed through the hosting of the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States in April 1969, in Lusaka. During the conference, attended by 14 African leaders, Kaunda asserted that by virtue of convening the meeting in “Lusaka, adjacent to the hostile minority regimes”, this was “a mark of progress” and “a milestone on the road to the complete liberation of this continent”.³⁴ Hosting the conference only five years after the country’s independence highlighted Lusaka’s role and importance in galvanising Africa’s opposition to colonial rule in Southern Africa. The conference not only challenged the legitimacy of the white minority regimes but also highlighted the strategic significance of Zambia’s diplomacy aimed at promoting the struggle for black majority rule. The significance of the conference was the adoption of the “Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa” by African leaders.³⁵ The manifesto emphasised the importance of pursuing negotiations first, as opposed to the recourse to violence, as the basis for achieving change.

Zambian authorities interpreted the manifesto as an expression of solidarity with liberation movements, yet it alarmed the leaders of the Lusaka‑based liberation movements. The complaint by the nationalist leaders revolved around two issues; firstly, they complained that the manifesto was drawn up without consulting them, and secondly they objected to the principle of negotiations by insisting that it weakened the case of the freedom fighters.³⁶ In fact, T. G. Silundika, ZAPU’s Secretary for Publicity, dismissed the manifesto as a “reactionary and dangerous” document (^{Shubin, 2019}, p. 80). However, Zambian authorities dismissed the nationalists’ concerns claiming that African leaders “were under no obligation to consult liberation movements” in adopting the Manifesto, and that they, in fact, “took into account the aspirations of freedom fighters”. A. N. Chimuka, Zambia’s Acting Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, insisted that the Heads of State were responsible for preferring “negotiations to bloodshed”. He concluded:

It would have been unwise and undiplomatic to be uncompromisingly inflexible […]. Negotiations were only acceptable on condition that the colonial powers accept the principle of transfer of power to the indigenous populations in which case the bone of contention would then revolve on the period and terms of transfer of effective power [...].³⁷

Although the Lusaka‑based liberation movements opposed the manifesto, its significance could not be underestimated. It was adopted by the OAU and endorsed both by the UN and the Non‑Aligned Movement at a conference in Lusaka in 1970. It also enhanced Zambia’s standing in Africa as a key player in the struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa and culminated into the election of Kaunda as Chairman of the OAU in September 1970.

8. Third Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non‑Aligned Movement, September 1970

The Third Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non‑Aligned Movement was hosted in Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 1970 and was attended by 62 world leaders as well as the Secretary General of the OAU and representatives of the liberation movements and solidarity organisations.³⁸ The conference was held at the Mulungushi Hall Complex designed and newly constructed by Energoprojekt, the Yugoslav‑based construction firm (^{Sekulić, 2023}, p. 257). In his opening speech, Kaunda stressed that in Southern Africa, “imperialism, colonialism and racial oppression still reign”, emphasising that “overt political, economic and military support given by Western nations to the regimes in South Africa, Portugal and rebel Rhodesia, have given a stamp of recognition and encouragement to the dominance exercised by the minorities over the majority”. He wished that “Western countries can heed our warning that those who delay the discharge of justice, those who stand in the way of peaceful change towards majority rule, make violence inevitable”.³⁹

The conference produced several resolutions, but the key ones which focused on the pertinent question of white minority rule in Southern Africa included resolutions pertaining to Zimbabwe, the Portuguese colonies, Apartheid and racial discrimination, and decolonisation.⁴⁰ Three themes were dominant in the resolutions relating to Southern Africa. Firstly, leaders of non‑aligned countries condemned white minority regimes for their racist, discriminatory and oppressive policies, but they also called for strengthening of economic sanctions against them. Secondly, they expressed solidarity with oppressed Africans in dependent territories and thirdly, non‑aligned leaders pledged renewed commitment to providing material and moral support to liberation movement.⁴¹ That Zambia successfully hosted the Third Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non‑Aligned Movement in Lusaka attended by a large number of world leaders was a significant measure of diplomatic achievement (^{Chongo, 2016}a).

The escalating wars of national liberation in Southern Africa from the early 1970s onwards led to the defeat of the Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique by the middle of the decade. Afterwards, renewed international focus shifted to the liberation war in Zimbabwe as frantic diplomatic efforts to secure a negotiated political solution to the conflict became more urgent. However, a series of international diplomatic attempts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian conflict failed, from the Geneva Conference of October 1976 in Switzerland, through the Anglo‑American Proposals of September 1977, to the Malta Conference of February 1978. As a consequence, Smith negotiated an internal settlement with internal black nationalist leaders in March 1978, but the new government of Abel Muzorewa lacked international legitimacy partly because it excluded Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, the two externally‑based nationalists who were controlling the army fighting against it, and partly because the structure of his new government did not reflect fundamental changes leading to a complete transfer of power to the majority. Although Muzorewa was elected Prime‑Minister, the real instruments of power - the army, the police, the judiciary and the civil service - remained in the hands of the white minority. Despite these inadequacies, the new British Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher declared its intention to recognise Muzorewa’s government. It took the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, during which Kaunda played a critical role, to change Thatcher’s mind (^{Chongo, 2016}b, p. 191).

9. The 22nd Commonwealth Conference, August 1979

In August 1979, Kaunda hosted the 22^nd Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, a meeting which played a decisive role in the final search for a peaceful political settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. Apart from securing an agreement on the new constitutional proposals for Rhodesia, it recognised the responsibility of Britain as the colonial power to grant legal independence to the settler colony. The conference was attended by 39 Heads of State and Government, but the large measure of its success was attributed to Kaunda’s diplomatic skill as Chairperson. In his opening speech, Kaunda declared that Rhodesia was still in rebellion, its leaders were rebels against the British Crown and there was an escalating liberation war led by the Patriotic Front to end that rebellion. He added that:

[Rhodesian] elections held in April [1979] were illegal [...] [and] produced an illegal and puppet government. Muzorewa succeeded rebel leader Ian Smith in office, but did not succeed him in power. [Black] majority rule must mean the total transfer of power from the minority. Power was not transferred to the majority in Rhodesia. What we have in Salisbury today is white power clad in black habiliments.⁴²

Kaunda’s speech set the tone of the meeting. It became clear that the question of Rhodesia would dominate the conference. Although he spoke to the Commonwealth leaders, Kaunda’s speech was specifically directed to Thatcher who, prior to attending the meeting, had expressed willingness to recognise Muzorewa’s government. On account of the tense atmosphere which characterised the meeting and the prospects of a clash over Zimbabwe‑Rhodesia, Kaunda adjourned the conference on 3 August for weekend talks involving a “contact group” consisting of himself, Nyerere, Thatcher, the Australian Prime Minister, Malcom Fraser, the Nigerian External Affairs Commissioner, General Henry Adefope, and the Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley. It was during the “retreat” that intensive, behind‑the‑scene diplomatic lobbying took place.

By the time the six leaders emerged from the weekend talks, it was clear they had secured an agreement on a new settlement initiative for Rhodesia. They produced a document on Rhodesia which was subsequently indorsed by all 39 participants at the conference. In it, the leaders: i) reaffirmed their commitment to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe; ii) recognised the defectiveness of internal settlement constitution in certain aspects; iii) accepted the constitutional responsibility of the British government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule; iv) emphasised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict; v) recognised the need for an urgent settlement in order to bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours; vi) accepted the importance of independence on the basis of majority rule and safeguards for minorities; vii) acknowledged the need for free and fair elections supervised by the British government and Commonwealth observers in choosing the new government; viii) welcomed the British governments’ intention to call for a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited; and ix) accepted the need for cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementing a lasting settlement.⁴³

Mark Chona, Kaunda’s Special Assistance for Political Affairs, recalled that the above document on Rhodesia was drafted in State House during the “retreat” of the Commonwealth Conference chaired by Kaunda. He stressed that it was a very separate meeting dedicated solely to discuss Rhodesia and when the conference resumed, the document was circulated to the rest of the Commonwealth leaders and debated by the participants of the conference. It was subsequently included in the final document, which Thatcher had already accepted during the weekend talks.⁴⁴ In short, the six leaders simply sought the endorsement by the participants of a document which they had already previously agreed upon during their private consultations at State House over the weekend. After the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, the British government formally invited Bishop Muzorewa, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe‑Rhodesia, and the co‑leaders of the Patriot Front, Nkomo and Mugabe, to participate in a constitutional conference at Lancaster House in London. The negotiations that followed led to the independence of Zimbabwe under black majority rule.

Conclusion

Previous accounts on the struggle for black majority rule in Southern Africa focused on international support rendered to the liberation movements. In the recent past, there has been a shift in the trajectory, as academics have been preoccupied with studying transnational histories of liberation movements and the lived experiences of exiled communities. However, evidence has revealed that as activists left home for exile in search of military training abroad, many traversed African capitals or “hubs of decolonisation” which, in many ways, “facilitated mobilities and exchanges through connectivity provided by existing or evolving infrastructures, institutions and networks based on political support and a favourable geographical location” (^{Burton, 2019}, p. 55). In an attempt to contribute to this literature, this study focused on the role and significance of Lusaka as a major “hub of decolonisation” in Southern Africa. As a result of Kaunda’s strong anti‑colonial stance, Lusaka became important for the liberation movements. Apart from embracing the city as their second home for many years, the nationalist leaders used the safe spaces to co‑operate and negotiate their future through discussions with “comrades” across different liberation movements as they forged new ideas about ways of organising armed resistance against white minority regimes. The city of Lusaka also served as a crucial site for the recruitment of fighters and a major transit centre for the cadres who went for military training in East Africa and beyond in socialist countries. Here, the role of the African Liberation Centre situated in Lusaka was crucial as it closely coordinated with the Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam in the transportation of cadres for military training.

The study insists that on the diplomatic front, the importance of Lusaka in relation to the struggle for black majority rule cannot be underestimated. From the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Lusaka was a major centre of diplomatic activities as it routinely hosted and sponsored key international conferences, including the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, Third Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non‑Aligned Movement, and the 22^nd Commonwealth Summit. These conferences were particularly significant because they directly challenged the legitimacy of white minority regimes through the issuance of anti‑colonial declarations and statements, but it can also be argued that the meetings illustrated the importance of Zambia’s diplomatic efforts, which subsequently led to Southern African countries’ attaining independence under black majority rule.

Conflicts of Interest Statement

The author declares that there are no conflicts of interest to disclose.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.