Resumo

THEISS, Viviane  e  BEUREN, Ilse Maria. The controlling shareholder and the executives’ remuneration in companies listed on BM & FBOVESPA. Rev. Portuguesa e Brasileira de Gestão [online]. 2014, vol.13, n.1, pp.02-13. ISSN 1645-4464.

The possibility of the largest controlling shareholder influencing the compensation of corporate executives motivated this study. The purpose is to verify whether or not the identity of the largest controlling shareholder results in differences in the executives’ remuneration in companies listed on the BM & FBOVESPA. Desk research was conducted on a sample of 172 open companies which disclosed the executives’ remuneration in the Reference Form. The survey results indicate that companies in which the control is made ​​up of shareholders agreements, the remuneration is greater than in family-controlled companies. This aspect is also confirmed in the remuneration comparative of those to the ones controlled by corporations, which have lower remuneration due to control being restricted to a small group of people. It is concluded that there are differences in executives’ remuneration according to the identity of the largest controlling shareholder in the companies surveyed.

Palavras-chave : Agency Theory; Executives’ Remuneration; Controlling Shareholder.

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