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<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0003-2573</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Análise Social]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Anál. Social]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0003-2573</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0003-25732005000500006</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[As eleições presidenciais em sistemas semipresidenciais: participação eleitoral e punição dos governos]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="fr"><![CDATA[L’électoralisme dans les municipalités portugaises: electoral participation and punishing governments]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Presidential elections in semi-presidential systems]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fortes]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Braulio Gómez]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A01"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Magalhães]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Pedro]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A02"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="A01">
<institution><![CDATA[,Instituto de Estudios Sociales de Andalucia  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<aff id="A02">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidade de Lisboa Instituto de Ciências Sociais ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>10</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>10</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>177</numero>
<fpage>891</fpage>
<lpage>922</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0003-25732005000500006&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0003-25732005000500006&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0003-25732005000500006&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Este artigo testa a hipótese de que as eleições presidenciais em sistemas semipresidenciais sejam eleições de «segunda ordem», ou seja, eleições, por um lado, com menor saliência para os eleitores e menor participação eleitoral e, por outro, onde os grandes partidos - especialmente os que controlam o governo - tendem a ser punidos eleitoralmente. Esta hipótese é testada recorrendo a dados eleitorais a nível agregado recolhidos em todas as eleições ocorridas em democracias semipresidenciais desde 1945. Conclui-se que a existência de padrões de «segunda ordem» nestas eleições é apenas parcial e depende, para além disso, dos poderes ao dispor dos presidentes, lançando dúvidas sobre a utilidade substantiva da categorização genérica de determinados sistemas de governo como sendo «semipresidenciais», pelo menos no que respeita aos padrões de comportamento eleitoral neles detectáveis.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="fr"><p><![CDATA[Cet article analyse l’existence de cycles politico-économiques dans les municipalités du continent portugais au cours de la période 1979-2001. Les résultats empiriques révèlent clairement un comportement électoraliste par les élus locaux qui, les années d’élections, augmentent les déficits et les dépenses municipales, en faisant croître l’emploi municipal. Dans ces dépenses, les plus fortes augmentations apparaissent dans les postes davantage en vue par l’électorat, tels que Viaducs, voirie et travaux complémentaires et Chemins ruraux. Dans la mesure où l’électoralisme des élus génère des inefficiences dans l’allocation des ressources, nous considérons que l’imposition de règles limitant la gestion discrétionnaire des finances locales s’avère bénéfique.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[This article tests the hypothesis that presidential elections in semipresidential systems are second-tier elections, in other words elections which, on the one hand, are less important to voters and have lower turnouts and, on the other hand, in which the major parties - especially those in power - tend to be punished in terms of voteshare. This hypothesis is tested through the use of overall election data from all the elections which have taken place in semi-presidential democracies since 1945. The article concludes that only partial «second-tier» patterns are to be found in these elections and that their results depend, in addition, on what powers are available to the president, thereby casting doubt on the substantive usefulness of the general description of certain systems of government as «semi-presidential», at least as far as detectable patterns of voter behaviour are concerned.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Eleições presidenciais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Sistemas semipresidenciais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Participação eleitoral]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><body><![CDATA[ <p><b>As elei&ccedil;&otilde;es presidenciais em sistemas semipresidenciais:    participa&ccedil;&atilde;o eleitoral e puni&ccedil;&atilde;o dos governos </b></p>     <P  ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Braulio G&oacute;mez Fortes<a href="#1">*</a> <a name="top1"></a>     <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Pedro Magalh&atilde;es<a href="#2">**</a> <a name="top2"></a>      <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">&nbsp;      <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Este artigo testa a hip&oacute;tese de que as elei&ccedil;&otilde;es    presidenciais em sistemas semipresidenciais sejam elei&ccedil;&otilde;es de    &laquo;segunda ordem&raquo;, ou seja, elei&ccedil;&otilde;es, por um lado, com    menor sali&ecirc;ncia para os eleitores e menor participa&ccedil;&atilde;o eleitoral    e, por outro, onde os grandes partidos &#8211; especialmente os que controlam    o governo &#8212; tendem a ser punidos eleitoralmente. Esta hip&oacute;tese    &eacute; testada recorrendo a dados eleitorais a n&iacute;vel agregado recolhidos    em todas as elei&ccedil;&otilde;es ocorridas em democracias semipresidenciais    desde 1945. Conclui-se que a exist&ecirc;ncia de padr&otilde;es de &laquo;segunda    ordem&raquo; nestas elei&ccedil;&otilde;es &eacute; apenas parcial e depende,    para al&eacute;m disso, dos poderes ao dispor dos presidentes, lan&ccedil;ando    d&uacute;vidas sobre a utilidade substantiva da categoriza&ccedil;&atilde;o    gen&eacute;rica de determinados sistemas de governo como sendo &laquo;semipresidenciais&raquo;,    pelo menos no que respeita aos padr&otilde;es de comportamento eleitoral neles    detect&aacute;veis.      <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Palavras-chave: Elei&ccedil;&otilde;es presidenciais, Sistemas    semipresidenciais, Participa&ccedil;&atilde;o eleitoral      <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">&nbsp;      <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY"><b>L&#8217;&eacute;lectoralisme dans les municipalit&eacute;s    portugaises </b>     <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Cet article analyse l&#8217;existence de cycles politico-&eacute;conomiques    dans les municipalit&eacute;s du continent portugais au cours de la p&eacute;riode    1979-2001. Les r&eacute;sultats empiriques r&eacute;v&egrave;lent clairement    un comportement &eacute;lectoraliste par les &eacute;lus locaux qui, les ann&eacute;es    d&#8217;&eacute;lections, augmentent les d&eacute;ficits et les d&eacute;penses    municipales, en faisant cro&icirc;tre l&#8217;emploi municipal. Dans ces d&eacute;penses,    les plus fortes augmentations apparaissent dans les postes davantage en vue    par l&#8217;&eacute;lectorat, tels que Viaducs, voirie et travaux compl&eacute;mentaires    et Chemins ruraux. Dans la mesure o&ugrave; l&#8217;&eacute;lectoralisme des    &eacute;lus g&eacute;n&egrave;re des inefficiences dans l&#8217;allocation des    ressources, nous consid&eacute;rons que l&#8217;imposition de r&egrave;gles    limitant la gestion discr&eacute;tionnaire des finances locales s&#8217;av&egrave;re    b&eacute;n&eacute;fique.      <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">&nbsp;      ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<P ALIGN="JUSTIFY"><b>Presidential elections in semi-presidential systems:    electoral participation and punishing governments </b>     <P ALIGN="justify">This article tests the hypothesis that presidential elections    in semipresidential systems are second-tier elections, in other words elections    which, on the one hand, are less important to voters and have lower turnouts    and, on the other hand, in which the major parties &#8212; especially those    in power &#8212; tend to be punished in terms of voteshare. This hypothesis    is tested through the use of overall election data from all the elections which    have taken place in semi-presidential democracies since 1945. The article concludes    that only partial &laquo;second-tier&raquo; patterns are to be found in these    elections and that their results depend, in addition, on what powers are available    to the president, thereby casting doubt on the substantive usefulness of the    general description of certain systems of government as &laquo;semi-presidential&raquo;,    at least as far as detectable patterns of voter behaviour are concerned.      <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>Texto completo disponível apenas em PDF.</p>     <p>Full text only available in PDF format.</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <P ALIGN="left"><B>Bibliografia</B>      <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">African Elections Database (2005), <I>African Elections Database,</I>    in <a href="http://africanelections.tripod.com/" target="_blank">http://africanelections.tripod.com/</a>     <!-- ref --><P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Alesina, Alberto, e Rosenthal, Howard (1989), &#171;Partisan    cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy&#187;, in <I>American    Political Science Review,</I> 83, pp. 373-98.      &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=000021&pid=S0003-2573200500050000600001&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Amorim Neto, Oct&aacute;vio, e Str&oslash;m, Kaare (2002),    &#171;Breaking the chain: the impact of presidents in cabinet selection in european    parliamentary democracies&#187;, comunica&ccedil;&atilde;o apresentada na Conference    on Electoral reform in Brazil in Comparative Perspective, Rio de Janeiro, 2002.      ]]></body>
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<body><![CDATA[<P ALIGN="JUSTIFY"><a href="#top1">*</a><a name="1"></a><a href="#top1"> </a>Instituto    de Estudios Sociales de Andalucia.      <P ALIGN="JUSTIFY"><a href="#top2">**</a> <a name="2"></a>Instituto de Ci&ecirc;ncias    Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa.      <p>&nbsp; </p>      ]]></body><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Alesina]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Alberto]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rosenthal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Howard]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Partisan cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Political Science Review]]></source>
<year>1989</year>
<volume>83</volume>
<page-range>373-98</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
