<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0003-2573</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Análise Social]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Anál. Social]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0003-2573</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0003-25732022000100160</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.31447/as00032573.2022242.07</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[O cumprimento dos programas eleitorais em Portugal: Tendências, reformas políticas e o papel dos veto players (1995-2019).]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Compliance with electoral programmes in Portugal: Trends, policy reforms, and the role of veto players (1995-2019).]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Belchior]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ana Maria]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Moury]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Catherine]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hanenberg]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Lúcio]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Nunes]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Pedro]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,IUL - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa ISCTE ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Lisboa ]]></addr-line>
<country>Portugal</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidade NOVA de Lisboa Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Lisboa ]]></addr-line>
<country>Portugal</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af3">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidade de Lisboa Instituto de Ciências Sociais ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Lisboa ]]></addr-line>
<country>Portugal</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>30</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>30</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>242</numero>
<fpage>160</fpage>
<lpage>184</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0003-25732022000100160&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0003-25732022000100160&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0003-25732022000100160&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo Em que medida os partidos portugueses cumprem as promessas eleitorais? E este cumprimento corresponde a reformas de curto ou de longo prazo? Ainda: em que medida os veto players condicionam o cumprimento do mandato pelos governos? Este artigo centra-se nestas questões, analisando sete legislaturas, entre 1995 e 2019, e um total de 6367 promessas. Os resultados revelam que o nível de cumprimento é consistentemente elevado, que as promessas de curto prazo, apesar de maioritárias, têm um nível de cumprimento igual às de longo prazo, e que os veto players podem condicionar significativamente a capacidade de concretização do mandato pelo executivo.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract To what extent Portuguese parties fulfil their electoral pledges? And does this fulfilment imply short- or long-term reforms? More: to what extent do veto players constrain the fulfilment of government mandates? This article focuses on these questions, analysing seven legislatures, from 1995 to 2919 and a total of 6367 pledges. The results show that the rate of fulfilment is consistently high, that short-term pledges, albeit the majority, hold a fulfilment rate equal to those of long-term, and that veto players can significatively constrain the executive&#8217;s capacity to carry out its mandate.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Portugal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[promessas eleitorais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[reformas políticas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[veto players]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Portugal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[electoral pledges]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[political reforms]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[veto players]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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