Carlos Duarte1, José Paulo Esperança2 e José Dias Curto3
RESUMO: A análise e explicação das determinantes das diversas formas de remuneração em Portugal são o principal objectivo deste trabalho. Apesar da existência de diversos estudos sobre remunerações, até agora não foram desenvolvidos estudos sobre quais as determinantes explicativas da realidade empresarial. Este estudo identifica o conjunto de características das empresas e dos colaboradores que explicam o montante e a probabilidade de auferir remuneração variável e quais as determinantes da remuneração base, comparando-se os dois modelos através do «colaborador padrão». Os resultados mostram que a remuneração variável é mais utilizada nos níveis hierárquicos superiores, na área comercial, em empresas de menor dimensão, em filiais de empresas estrangeiras e para colaboradores com educação superior. Quanto à rendibilidade, os resultados revelam uma relação positiva com a probabilidade de existência de remuneração variável. No entanto, os montantes de remuneração variável são mais elevados nas empresas com menor rendibilidade.
Palavras-chave: Remuneração Variável, Teoria da Agência, Mercado Interno de Trabalho, Modelo Tobit
TITLE: Determinants of remunerations within Portuguese firms
ABSTRACT: The main purpose of this work is the inquiry and explanation of the determinants of the different forms of remuneration in Portugal. Although the existence of several studies on remuneration, so far it had not been presented studies shedding light on which determinants firms stand for their pay practices. This study identifies the set of characteristics of the companies and collaborators that explain the amount and the probability to have variable remuneration and which the determinants are of base pay, using a ‘standard collaborator’ for comparison. The results reveal that variable remuneration is more common in top levels, in the commercial area, in small companies, affiliates of foreign companies (but with inferior amounts) and for collaborators with higher levels of education.Concerning profitability, there is a positive relation with the probability of existence of variable remuneration. However, the values of variable remuneration are higher in lower profitable companies.
Key words:Variable Compensation, Agency Theory, Internal Labour Market, Tobit Model
]]> TITULO: Factores en la remuneración en las empresas portuguesas
RESUMEN: El análisis y explicación de los factores en las diferentes formas de remuneración en Portugal son el principal objetivo de este trabajo. No obstante la existencia de varios estudios sobre remuneraciones, hasta la fecha no han sido desarrollados estudios sobre los factores explicativos de la realidad empresarial. Este estudio identifica el conjunto de características de las empresas y de sus colaboradores que revelan el valor y la probabilidad de recibir una remuneración variable y cuales los factores determinantes de la remuneración base, comparándose los dos modelos a través del “colaborador-padrón”. Los resultados muestran que la remuneración variable es mas utilizada en los niveles hieraquicos superiores, en el área comercial, en empresas de menor dimensión, en filiales de empresas extranjeras y para colaboradores con educación superior. Relativamente a la rentabilidad, los resultados revelan una relación positiva con la probabilidad de existencia de remuneración variable. Sin embargo, los valores de remuneración variable son más elevados en las empresas de menor rentabilidad.
Palabras clave: Remuneración Variable, Teoria de la Agencia, Marcado Interno del Trabajo, Modelo Tobit
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1Carlos Duarte
]]> cduarte@ipt.ptDoutorado em Gestão na especialidade de Finanças (ISCTE, 2006) é Professor Coordenador na Escola Superior de Gestão de Tomar, do Instituto Politécnico de Tomar.
PhD in Management (ISCTE, 2006), is coordinator professor in Management at Instituto Politécnico de Tomar (IPT).
Doctor en gestión en la especialidad de Finanzas (ISCTE, 2006) es Profesor Coordinador en la Escola Superior de Gestão de Tomar, del Instituto Politécnico de Tomar.
2José Paulo Esperança
Doutorado em Economia (Instituto Universitário Europeu, 1993) é professor catedrático de Finanças do ISCTE e professor encarregado de missão com o pelouro da internacionalização junto da Presidência do ISCTE e presidente do AUDAX.
PhD in Economics (European University Institute, 1993), is full professor in Finance at ISCTE, head of ISCTE internationalization unit and AUDAX – entrepreneurship and family business centre.
Doctor en economía (Instituto Universitário Europeu, 1993) es profesor catedrático en Finanzas del ISCTE y profesor encargado de la misión con la internacionalización adjunto a la Presidencia del ISCTE y presidente del AUDAX.
]]>3José Dias Curto
Doutorado em Gestão na especialidade de Métodos de Quantitativos (ISCTE, 2003) é professor auxiliar e director do Mestrado em Gestão do ISCTE.
PhD in Quantitative Methods for Management (ISCTE Business School, 2003). Assistant Professor at ISCTE and director of the MSc in Management.
Doctor en gestión en la especialidad de Métodos de Cuantitativos (ISCTE, 2003) es profesor auxiliar y director del mestrado en gestión del ISCTE.
Recebido em Novembro de 2006 e aceite em Setembro de 2007
Received in November 2006 and accepted in September 2007
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